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People in developing countries are more often affected by rare events, such as 
natural disasters and epidemics, than people in developed nations. Furthermore, the 
intensity of these events is usually higher in poor countries. Among policymakers, 
these rare events and other external shocks, such as terms-of-trade fluctuations and 
changes in international conditions, are often explicitly or implicitly blamed for the 
bad performance of growth. Do these rare events affect economic growth? Are the 
frequency and intensity of these rare events helpful in explaining the gap in income 
between rich and poor countries? The answer to this question is important not only 
for evaluating policies aimed at preventing these events and mitigating their 
consequences, but also for understanding the reasons why some countries are rich and 
some poor.  
  
Although there has been a steady increase in the number of researchers 
tackling these questions, the effects of rare events on economic development and 
long-run growth remain unclear. There are some studies reporting negative effects 
while others report no effect or even positive effects. The purpose of this dissertation 
is to show that these seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled by exploring 
the effects of disasters on growth separately by type of disaster. This study examines 
the long- term economic impact of natural disasters and epidemics and shows that 
different types of rare events (natural disasters and epidemics) appear to be associated 
with different patterns of economic vulnerability and so entail different options for 
reducing risk.  
A few main conclusions emerge. Rare events significantly affect economic 
development but not always negatively, and differently across types of disasters and 
economic sectors. Hence, in order to understand and assess the economic 
consequences of natural disasters and epidemics and the implications for policy, it is 
necessary to consider the pathways through which different types of events affect 
economic development, the different risks posed, and the ways in which economies 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
People in developing countries are more often affected by rare events, such as 
natural disasters and epidemics, than people in developed nations.1 Furthermore, the 
intensity of these events (i.e. the number of people affected) is usually higher in poor 
countries.2 Among policymakers these rare events and other external shocks, such as 
terms-of-trade fluctuations and changes in international conditions, are often explicitly or 
implicitly blamed for the bad performance of growth.3 Are natural disasters and 
epidemics bad for economic growth? The answer to this question is important not only 
for evaluating policies aimed at preventing these events and mitigating their 
consequences, but also for understanding the reasons why some countries are rich and 
some poor.  
This question may become even more relevant in the years to come if, as some 
observers suggest, natural disasters and epidemics continue to grow in frequency and 
intensity as a consequence of climate change.4 The damages from disasters have been 
increasing exponentially over the last several decades (Millennium Ecosystem 
                                                 
1 For example, Benson and Clay (2004) report that the largest concentration of high-risk countries which 
are increasingly vulnerable to climatic hazards is in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2 Cavallo and Noy (2010) report that “The overwhelming majority of people affected and killed by natural 
disasters are coming from developing countries, particularly in the Asia‐Pacific region” 
3 Reports by the IMF (2003), World Bank (2004) and Unctad (2002) state that “exogenous shocks . . . can 
have a significant negative impact on developing countries' growth, macroeconomic stability, debt 
sustainability and poverty", and that “low-income countries are particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters, terms-of-trade shocks, and other adverse shocks.”  
4 The reader might be surprised by the assertion that “climate change” is increasing the frequency of 
epidemics, but this is indeed the case. Miguel A. Luque argues that “climate change is affecting the 
dynamic and resurgence of infectious sickness in a key fashion, concretely malaria and cholera.”  His study 







Assessment, 2005).  They are increasing in frequency and magnitude, measured both in 
terms of human lives lost and destroyed infrastructure (Costanza and Farley, 2007). For 
example, Munich Re (1999) reports that the global cost of natural disasters has increased 
by 1500% since 1950. In 1995 the Kobe earthquake in Japan generated about US$178 
billion in losses, the equivalent of 0.7 percent of global gross domestic product. 
The relevance of these rare events for the economy has instigated an incipient 
literature on their economic implications. However, most of the attention has 
concentrated on the immediate and short-run economic implications of these events, and 
less attention has been paid to the problems they could pose for longer-term economic 
growth and development. In particular, a large number of studies on the economic 
impacts of natural disasters have concentrated on the most easily measured direct losses, 
and in particular for the case of earthquakes, on the economic costs of visible physical 
damage. The main reason why most studies have concentrated on the short-term 
implications of rare events is the importance policy makers assign to measuring the needs 
of affected people in the aftermath of a natural disaster or epidemic. But another 
explanation is the practical difficulty of measuring the indirect and long-run impacts that 
result as the effects of a disaster shock spread through the economy.  
These limitations have severely restricted the information available to 
policymakers, and have contributed to a failure to address the possibly serious threat that 
these rare events pose to sustainable development. In order to help policymakers gauge 
the benefits from disaster risk mitigation and adaptation, it is important both to analyze 






understanding of the long-run economic costs associated with them. The goal of this 
dissertation is to contribute to our comprehension of how the intensity and frequency of 
natural disasters and epidemics affect economic growth and development. 
How can rare events affect economic growth? 
Although disasters and epidemics can and sometimes do have severe negative 
short-run impacts, they also, can have negative longer term consequences for economic 
growth and development, especially when they occur frequently. As Benson and Clay 
(2004) argue, rare events have the potential to affect economic growth through their 
effect on output, investment, fiscal balances and the balance of payments.  
There are several channels through which the events considered in this study can 
affect medium to long-run growth. For example, after a natural disaster governments may 
divert resources away from planned investments to fund relief and rehabilitation, or may 
increase external borrowing, which increases future debt-servicing payments. 
Additionally, by killing off mainly young adults, some epidemics may seriously shrink 
the tax base and thus reduce the resources available for public expenditure, including 
those aimed at infrastructure or development programs, or increase the budget deficit and 
the need for borrowing. In this regard, Cochrane (1994) explored the impact of disasters 
on a country’s indebtedness, and concluded that disasters can lower a country’s credit 
rating, which in turn increases interest rates on external borrowing dampening investment 
and reducing sustainable development. Also, frequent disasters and epidemics can 






reduce long-run growth. Finally, some epidemics may affect the accumulation of human 
capital and as a result reduce long-run growth. 
On the other hand, some events may have a positive impact on growth. For 
example, large reconstruction programs required in the aftermath of an earthquake may 
creat a construction boom that can last several years. Furthermore, it is widely believed 
that the international community responds to disasters by increasing assistance. External 
Aid typically provides support for development, including investment in infrastructure, 
which has the potential to foster future growth.   
In addition, disasters and epidemics could have a positive impact on medium-term 
growth, by instigating changes in policy that may speed up reconstruction efforts and 
much needed reforms. Benson and Clay (2004) argue that “disasters can induce policy 
changes and institutional innovations that are ultimately beneficial, not only in reducing 
vulnerability but also in supporting economic growth and development.” Clay (1985) and 
Ahmed, Chowdhury, and Haggblade (2000) provide concrete examples. For instance, 
Bangladesh adopted food policy reforms directed at preventing a recurrence of the 1974 
floods and containing the financial costs of subsequent floods, while the deregulation of 
agricultural investment after the floods in 1987 and 1988 encouraged the rapid expansion 
of disaster-reducing irrigation.  
In summary, catastrophic events, whether natural disasters or epidemics, can 
induce conscious responses, relating to technical progress, policy changes, and 







What is the contribution of this thesis? 
A good number of scholars have attempted to answer the question of whether rare 
events have a significant impact on the process of development. As expected, several 
papers report a negative effect of disasters on growth.  For instance, using a cross-country 
sample for the period 1970-2005 (and the same database used in this thesis), Raddatz 
(2007) finds that rare events, including natural disasters and epidemics, lead to a 
reduction of real GDP growth. However, many other studies find no effect, or at times 
even a positive one (see Chapters 2 and Chapter 3 for details on the literature).   
Overall, the current empirical literature remains inconclusive about the effects of 
rare events on growth. This should not be a surprise since, as explained above, economic 
growth theory suggests that different types of shocks can have diverse (even opposite) 
effects on growth. Some events could foster increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
for instance by easing the passage of difficult reforms (Benson and Clay, 2004). Disasters 
can also have differential impacts on growth due to their diverse influence on the supply 
of intermediate inputs, human and physical capital, etc.  
This dissertation seeks therefore to reconcile the apparent contradictions in the 
current empirical literature through a more systematic recognition that different events 
affect economic sectors through different channels and that, as a result, their effects are 
likely to differ both by sector and by the type of disaster. 
The first and most important distinction that needs to be made is between natural 






earthquakes tend to destroy physical capital and affect TFP, but have less effect on 
human capital. On the contrary, epidemics have no effect on physical capital, but have a 
huge impact on human capital. In other words, natural disasters and epidemics are events 
so different that their effects on growth should be treated separatly, contrary to Raddatz 
(2007). This is the approach taken in this disseration. Consequently, Chapter 2 analyzes 
the relationship between natural disasters and economic growth, while Chapter 3 
considers the implications that epidemics have for long-term development. 
Further disaggregation needs to be made between different types of natural 
disasters, and also between various epidemics. For the case of natural disasters, it should 
be clear that earthquakes are very different from climatologic hazards, such as droughts, 
floods and storms. First, earthquakes are random, stochastic events of uncertain and low 
probability, whereas climatological events occur more often. Earthquakes should thus be 
treated as a different type of shock than floods, droughts and storms. In addition, floods 
and droughts must be considered separately, since they are, indeed, opposite events and 
might entail very different effects on growth, particularly in agriculture. 
When it comes to epidemics, there is also a strong need for disaggregation. As 
Chapter 3 will explain in more detail, some epidemics have a stronger effect than others 
on human capital accumulation, and therefore are more likely to have a negative impact 
on economic development. Hence, different epidemics should also be treated separately. 
An important difference between the papers presented in this dissertation and the 
previous literature is that many previous works treat these events as isolated, one-off 






reasonable assumption for a low-probability event such as an earthquake, but in order to 
study the impact on long-term development of relatively frequent events, such as floods, 
droughts and cholera epidemics, it seems natural to undertake analysis over a longer 
period, such as five years, to measure the potentially cumulative impacts. Hence, the 
focus of this thesis is on medium-term economic growth. Another reason to focus on 
medium-term economic growth is that a five year horizon is typical for economic 
planning, which is crucial in the case of disaster reconstruction.  The long run is not 
relevant for most governments faced with shocks.  
In order to analyze the effect of natural disasters and epidemics on medium-term 
economic growth, I use pooled cross-country and time-series data covering 94 countries 
organized in non-overlapping five-year periods, with each country having at most 9 
observations. I first estimate the effect of rare events on the growth rate of per capita 
GDP using ordinary least squares, controlling for unobserved country and regional-
specific factors, time fixed effects and proxies for investment in human capital, financial 
depth, stability of monetary and fiscal policies, openness to international markets, and 
foreign shocks. Second, in order to addresses endogeneity problems and check the 
robustness of the OLS results, I use a dynamic panel GMM estimation procedure 
developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Specifically, 
these estimators address the econometric problems induced by country-specific effects, 
endogeneity, and the routine use of lagged dependent variables in growth regressions. I 
first take differences to eliminate country-specific effects and thereby remove omitted 
variable bias. Next, I instrument the right-hand-side variables (the differenced values of 






as instruments. This last step removes the inconsistency arising from simultaneity bias, 
including biases induced by the differenced lagged dependent variable. This methodology 
has increasingly been used in studies of growth (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; 
Carkovic and Levine, 2005). 
Furthermore, I complement the long term growth analysis by presenting a detailed 
short-run analysis of the aftermath of natural disasters and epidemics, tracing the yearly 
response of GDP growth to the onset of these events. This is a necessary step because, as 
the theoretical model shows, it can be the case that an event has no long-run (permanent) 
consequences for economic growth, but generates a significant decline in the short-run 
followed by a recovery. Using annual data, I estimate the short-run impact of natural 
disasters and epidemics on economic growth using a panel vector auto-regression model 
(panel VAR). Specifically, I focus on the orthogonalized impulse-response functions, 
which show the response of economic growth to an orthogonal shock in epidemics. 
Although this methodology has already been used to study the short-run implications of 
natural disasters, to my knowledge, this is the first time that is used to study the impact of 
epidemics. 
Consistent with other studies, the data on natural disasters are obtained from the 
Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) database of the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).  The share of the population affected by a specific 
type of disaster over a given period of time is taken as the measure of natural disaster.  
This measure reflects both the frequency and intensity of disasters.  The sample spans 94 






In Chapter 2, I examine the effects of different natural disasters (droughts, floods, 
earthquakes and storms) separately by economic sector (agriculture, industry, and 
services), controlling for a series of well known growth determinants. The paper broadens 
the scope of the existing literature, which has so far largely concentrated on aggregate 
measures of disasters and/or economic activity.  This disaggregated approach also yields 
preliminary insights into the distributive effects of natural disasters.  Here, three major 
conclusions emerge.  First, different disasters affect growth in different economic sectors 
differently and the results obtained with over-aggregated data are misleading.  Second, 
while moderate disasters can have a positive growth effect on certain sectors, severe 
disasters do not.  Third, growth is more sensitive to natural disasters in developing than 
developed countries—more sectors are affected, the magnitudes are larger and non-
trivial, and the poor are more likely to be more affected by disasters (both positively and 
negatively.) 
Chapter 3 performs a similar analysis but with epidemics. The main finding of 
Chapter 3 is that different types of epidemics have different effects on economic growth. 
In particular I find that Cholera epidemics increase growth in the short and long run, 
while Influenza epidemics produce a negative effect on short-run growth, but no effect in 
the long-run. Furthermore, I find that the epidemics-growth relationship is robust to using 
instrumental variables to control for endogeneity.  
The most important prescription coming out from the present study is that risk 
management strategies need to recognize that diferent types of events have very different 
implications for the macroeconomy. The two broad categories of natural disasters and 






so entail different options for reducing risk. To understand and assess the economic 
consequences of natural disasters and epidemics and the implications for policy, it is 
necessary to consider the pathways through which different types of events affect 
economic development, the different risks posed, and the ways in which economies can 
respond to these threats. 
Finally, I should emphasize that, although my work purports to study growth, it is 
perhaps better suited to explain the variation of “income levels,” rather than “growth 
rates.” From the regressions presented here, it is not clear whether disasters affect the 
long-run growth rate, the steady state level of income, or both. Disentangling the two is 
almost impossible, and this problem is not unique to this study. However, this problem is 
not as important as it may appear. A large effect on the steady state level of income may 
be as important in practical terms as a growth effect, and of just as much relevance for 
policy. As Robert Hall and Jones (1997) have suggested, this may be a more natural 
question, since we are only interested in growth rates because of their impact on levels. 
Hence, strictly speaking, in this dissertation I do not claim that rare events have an effect 
on the long-run growth rate of the economy; rather I claim that they represent an 








Chapter 2: Do All Natural Disasters have the same consequences 
for Economic Growth? 
 
Introduction 
Do all Natural Disasters have the same implications for the economy? Do 
droughts, floods, earthquakes and storms have the same impact on economic growth? The 
existing literature on the macroeconomic effects of natural disasters seems to believe that 
the answer to these questions is yes, as most existing studies treat all types of events as 
equal. Although some papers find that natural disasters reduce growth, others find no 
significant relationship or even a positive one. The thesis of the present work is that 
existing studies have missed a very important point: different types of disasters have 
diverse (even opposite) effects on growth. Therefore, if droughts, floods, earthquakes and 
storms are treated as if they are the same event, their estimated effect on growth will be 
ambiguous. 
The aim of the present paper is to fill this gap in the literature by studying the 
disaggregated impact of disasters (i.e. droughts, floods, earthquakes and storms) on the 
growth rate of aggregate GDP per capita and the growth rate of per capita value added of 
the agriculture, industry and service sectors. The main contribution of the paper is to 
show that the relationship between natural disasters and growth depends on the type of 
disaster being considered. 
The fact that the current empirical literature remains inconclusive about the 






economic growth theory suggests that different types of disasters can have diverse (even 
opposite) effects on growth, in particular at the sectoral level. Some disasters could foster 
increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), for instance by easing the passage of 
difficult reforms (Benson and Clay, 2004). Disasters can also have differential impacts on 
growth due to their diverse influence on the supply of intermediate inputs. Consider, for 
instance, droughts and floods: while droughts reduce the supply of water, an essential 
input for agriculture, floods increase it, and under some circumstances may therefore 
increase agricultural production (a prediction consistent with our empirical findings). 
Even disasters that affect capital, such as earthquakes, need not reduce growth: Okuyama 
(2003) and Hallegatte and Dumas (2009), for instance, study circumstances under which 
destroyed capital could be replaced with more productive capital, thus fostering medium 
term growth. Growth theory suggests therefore that disasters can have a positive impact 
on growth, in particular at the sectoral level. Whether this is actually the case remains an 
empirical question.  
This paper estimates the impact of natural disasters on economic growth directly 
using cross-country data disaggregated by sector and type of disaster, thereby avoiding 
the pitfalls of existing models and their reliance on assumptions that are often difficult to 
justify. In some cases I relate the findings of the paper to growth models. However, the 
purpose of my work is not to distinguish between specific growth models.  
The analysis uses standard empirical growth equations to measure the nature and 
strength of statistical association between the frequency and intensity of different types of 
natural disasters and growth. In the first step the focus is on medium-term economic 






economic planning. The effects of the different natural disasters (i.e. droughts, floods, 
earthquakes and storms) are examined separately by economic sector (agriculture, 
industry, and services), each time controlling for a series of well known growth 
determinants. This way the paper broadens the scope of the existing literature, which has 
so far largely concentrated on aggregate measures of disasters and/or economic activity.  
This disaggregated approach also yields preliminary insights in the distributive effects of 
natural disasters.  Through the use of the dynamic panel GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) great care is taken in 
addressing endogeneity issues related to the potential correlation between explanatory 
variables and unobserved country-specific factors.    
Then, to check the robustness of the results and also to look at the path of 
adjustment and recovery from the different types of disasters, I run a panel-VAR using 
annual data to illustrate the aftermath of natural disasters. This exercise, which has been 
done before by Fomby et al (2010), enables me to trace the yearly response of economic 
growth to the four types of disasters considered.  
Consistent with other studies, the data on natural disasters are obtained from the 
Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) database of the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).  The share of the population affected by a specific 
type of disaster over a given period of time is taken as the measure of natural disaster.  
This measure reflects both the frequency and intensity of disasters.  The sample spans 94 
developing and developed countries over the period 1961-2005.  
I find strong evidence that different types of natural disasters have different 






statistically insignificant effect on overall GDP growth, which reflects well the theoretical 
ambiguity and the inconsistent empirical evidence on the growth impact of natural 
disasters in the received literature. Then, I attempt to disentangle this ambiguity by 
disaggregating the analysis by type of disaster. I find that droughts have a negative effect 
on growth possibly because they entail the drastic reduction of water, a vital intermediate 
input in agricultural production.  
Floods, on the other hand, have a positive effect on growth. They may induce a 
short-run disruption of agriculture and farming in the immediately affected. However, in 
other areas of the country and in subsequent years, the over-supply of water may lead to 
higher growth through an increase in land productivity due to the larger quantity of this 
vital intermediate input.  
Earthquakes have a strong positive impact on industrial growth. Although 
earthquakes affect both workers and capital, they particularly destroy buildings, 
infrastructure, and factories. The capital-worker ratio is then sharply diminished, the 
average (and marginal) product of capital increases, and output grows as the economy 
enters a cycle of reconstruction. Moreover, if destroyed capital is replaced by a vintage of 
better quality, factor productivity increases, leading to further growth.  
Finally, storms have a negative effect on growth. They destroy considerable 
amounts of physical capital, apparently more than they kill or incapacitate workers. By 
itself, this mechanism would suggest a growth expansion (as the capital-worker ratio 
drops). However, storms also have a harmful effect on communications, public utilities 
(including electricity), and transportation, causing severe disruption of urban life and 






materials and intermediate inputs that this entails may explain why storms damage the 
predominantly urban economic activities of industry and services. 
A few main conclusions emerge. First, different disasters affect growth in 
different economic sectors differently and the results obtained with over-aggregated data 
are misleading.  Second, while moderate disasters can have a positive growth effect on 
certain sectors, severe disasters do not.  Third, growth is more sensitive to natural 
disasters in developing countries than developed countries—more sectors are affected, 
the magnitudes are larger and non-trivial, and the poor are more likely to be affected by 
disasters (both positively and negatively).  
 
Related Literature 
This paper is related to papers in the growth literature and empirical studies on the 
macroeconomic implications of natural disasters. Empirical research on the 
macroeconomic implications of natural disasters has grown exponentially during the last 
decade. While many studies suggest a negative impact of natural disasters on immediate 
growth, some find no relationship, or even a positive one. Rasmussen (2004), for 
instance, assesses the impact of natural disasters using a cross-country sample for the 
period 1970 through 2002. He finds that natural disasters lead to a median reduction of 
2.2% in the same-year real GDP growth, and that they increase the current account deficit 
and public debt. Other studies that find a negative impact are, among others, Raddatz 
(2007), Heger, Julca, and Paddison (2008), and Noy (2009); based on reviews of events 
(as opposed to cross-country studies), Charveriat (2000), Crowards (2000), and Auffret 






equal amount of studies find no or even a positive relationship between natural disasters 
and growth. Among others, Caselli and Malhotra (2004), testing the empirical validity of 
the predictions of the Solow model, fail to find a positive relationship between natural 
disasters and aggregate economic growth; and, in accordance to our findings, Jaramillo 
(2007) observes that the sign and magnitude of the relationship depends on the type of 
disaster. The paper however fails to look at sectoral growth (which we find to be equally 
important as the type of disaster), and does not correct for potential biases using a 
dynamic panel specification (see below for details). Albala-Bertrand (1993, Ch. 4) and 
Raddatz (2007) also find no or little effect. 
 A related strand of literature also demonstrates that the economic impact of 
disasters depends on the countries' economic and social conditions: among others, a 
country's level of economic development, the quality of its institutions, democratic 
election processes, educational attainments, and greater openness have consistently been 
found to reduce casualties and damages, and to improve macroeconomic performance 
after the event (Kahn, 2003; Rasmussen, 2004; Toya and Skidmore, 2005; Skidmore and 
Toya, 2007; Noy, 2009). 
 While the mentioned studies, including ours, analyze the relationship between 
natural disasters and short-run (i.e. "immediate") growth, some studies have also 
attempted to study how natural disasters are related to growth in the long-run. Skidmore 
and Toya (2002), among others, consider average per capita GDP growth over the 1960-
1990, and find that climatic disasters are associated with higher long-run economic 
growth, while geologic disasters are negatively associated with growth; Hallegatte and 






affects the macroeconomic response; and Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner (2008) 
find that natural catastrophic risk is negatively associated with knowledge and technology 
transfers from more to less developed countries. In analyzing long-term empirical 
relationships, causality considerations are however complicated by biases generated by 
the ability of countries to adopt in the long run technologies that are less sensitive to 
frequent disasters. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents some stylized 
facts on the relationship between natural disasters and economic growth; then Section 4 
presents the conceptual framework to gain intuition on the implications of different types 
of natural disasters for economic growth. Section 5 discusses the data and empirical 
methodology. Finally, Section 6 presents the results of the estimation and discusses their 
consistency with the theoretical growth model. Section 7 concludes. 
 
Some Stylized Facts  
In thinking about natural disasters and growth, it is helpful to begin by 
establishing some stylized facts. This section highlights some of the most interesting 
regularities in the data. 
I start by looking at the data on natural disasters. As defined in the EM‐DAT 
database, natural disasters are fairly common events, and their incidence has been 
growing over time. Figure 1 plots the number of natural events over the span of the last 
four decades. The figure shows that the number of disasters has been growing over time 
in the world. In the Asia and Pacific region, for example, which is the region with the 






decade in the 1970’s to over 28 events in the 2000’s. In other regions, while the increase 
is less dramatic, the trend is similar. However, these patterns appear to be driven to some 
extent by improved recording of milder events, rather than by an increase in the 
frequency of occurrence. 
 


































































Source: author’s own calculations using data on natural disasters 
from CRED- EMDAT. 
 
Contrary to Figure 1, truly large events are rare, and there is no time trend for the 
subset of large events in any region. For example, the frequency of large events is only 
0.5 episodes per country per decaade. This suggests that there is a high incidence of small 
disasters in the sample or, more precisely, that the threshold for what constitutes a 
disaster (and hence gets recorded in the dataset) is quite lenient.  
If we look at the relationship between natural disasters and growth, the most 
striking aspect of the data the disparity in growth rates between years with a particular 
disaster and years without these disasters. Table A shows the difference between the 






(Agriculture, Industry and Service) when the economy suffers natural disaster “X” and 
when it does not suffer disaster “X”. This provides a measure of the immediate impact of 
disaster “X” on the different growth rates. Table A suggests that growth in most sector of 
economic activity is significantly lower during years with droughts and storms, but 
higher during years with floods and earthquakes (although for earthquakes the difference 
is not statistically significant). 
This feature of the data is in harmony with the results presented in Table B, which 
presents the outcome of regressing the different measures of growth against the different 
measures of natural disasters, using yearly data and controlling for country fixed effects. 
Table B demonstrates that, while droughts have a significant negative effect on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita and agricultural growth, floods have a positive one. 
Finally, the effects of earthquakes and storms are not. 
These disparities in the growth performance across different types of natural 
disasters would be consistent with the view that natural disasters have diverse effects on 
the different sectors of the economy. This view is consistent with the empirical approach 































Yes 0.1% -3.0% 0.4% 0.8%
No 1.7% 0.6% 2.1% 1.6%
Yes 2.2% 1.1% 1.9% 2.1%
No 1.7% 0.2% 1.8% 1.7%
Yes 2.2% 1.5% 2.3% 1.9%
No 1.5% 0.2% 1.4% 1.7%
Yes 1.6% -0.1% 0.7% 2.2%








Table B  
Growth and Natural Disasters
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (Yearly Data)
Methodology: Simple OLS with country fixed effects










Drought -0.0118*** -0.0311*** -0.00186 -0.00122
(0.00319) (0.00507) (0.00368) (0.00365)
Floods 0.00358** 0.00570** 0.00224 0.00418**
(0.00175) (0.00279) (0.00206) (0.00199)
Earthquakes 0.00111 0.00223 0.00195 0.00373
(0.00415) (0.00663) (0.00484) (0.00478)
Storms -5.32e-05 -0.00200 0.000153 0.00136
(0.00229) (0.00333) (0.00264) (0.00233)
Observations 3948 3829 3749 3749
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses










This section lays out the conceptual framework used to interpret our empirical 
findings in the following sections. The presentation is divided in two. First, I discuss how 
to think about the different implications natural disasters may have for economic 
development. Second, I present a simple two sector model of growth than captures a few 
of the most important channels through which natural disasters affect growth. 
From a theoretical point of view there are various models that could rationalize 
how different shocks (natural disasters) affect economic growth in the medium to long-
run. Some natural disasters undoubtedly have a negative short term impact on GDP, and 
many do affect growth negatively in the medium to long term. For example, droughts can 
cause heavy crop and livestock losses over wide areas, often affecting several countries 
simultaneously, as happened in southern Africa in the early 1990s. Extreme droughts may 
persist, lasting a few years. Such events have implications not only for agriculture but 
also for other water related, hydrologically sensitive sectors of an economy, such as 
hydroelectricity and domestic water supply (Hulme et al 2001).  
Disasters may also affect long-run growth through increased indebtedness. Larger 
fiscal deficits, generated by the need to respond to natural disasters, have potential long-
term development implications, primarily relating to the opportunity cost of future debt-
servicing and repayment costs. Disasters can exacerbate external debt pressures to the 
extent that they destroy infrastructure and other assets funded with outstanding external 
loans. Benson and Clay (1998) show that droughts generate big fiscal inbalances. Five of 
the six economies analized in their paper showed a sharp increase in government 






However, some disasters could, at least in principle, have a positive impact on 
medium term economic growth. While factors affecting growth negatively have been 
widely discussed (ranging from TFP shocks, to shocks to capital and labor, to shortages 
in the supply of materials/intermediate inputs), reasons why disasters can affect growth 
positively in the medium term (in particular at the sectoral level) have been less explored.  
This section reviews some of these channels. 
Before doing so, observe that the empirical findings of this paper point toward a 
positive impact of some disasters on sectoral growth net of the initial output drop. That 
means that disasters create a spur to economic growth that not only allowes full recovery 
within the five year window we consider, but actually generate levels of per capita GDP 
that exceed what they would have been under the no shock scenario. Conditional 
convergence in exogenous growth models cannot explain such a positive impact on 
growth (as such models predict that levels would remain lower for several periods).  
Conceptually, there are four channels through which natural disasters increase 
medium term growth: increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP); increases in the 
supply of materials/intermediate inputs; replacement of destroyed capital with newer and 
more productive capital (as in a vintage capital model); and increases in capital 
utilization. 
Natural disasters might negatively affect Total Factor Productivity in the short 
term by, for instance, disrupting essential transportation and communication 
infrastructure, lowering the productivity of capital and labor, or worsening the 






however, disasters could have a positive impact on TFP, for instance by instigating 
changes in policy that may speed up reconstruction efforts and much needed reforms.  
A disaster affecting the supply of materials/intermediate inputs can also have vast 
disruptive consequences. As we shall see, however, in some rare instances disasters can 
have the opposite effect, and increase the supply of intermediate inputs and therefore 
growth in some sectors. For instance this may be the case with floods, which by 
increasing the supply of water may have a beneficial effect on agriculture and electricity 
generation. 
Disasters such as earthquakes that reduce the supply of capital can also foster 
growth under some circumstances. Among others, this has been explored by Okuyama 
(2003) and Hallegatte and Dumas (2009), who study circumstances under which, in the 
context of a vintage capital model, replacement of old capital with more productive 
capital following a disaster could spur medium term growth. The likelihood of productive 
depends on various factors, including the severity of the shock. Hallegatte et al (2007) 
and Hallegatte and Dumas (2009), for instance, show that “poverty traps” are likely to 
emerge when disasters are frequent, or when reconstruction costs are considerable. 
While all disasters are likely to create amix of positive and negative effects, some 
disasters are more likely a priori to have a negative impact on some sectors than others. 
Droughts and floods, for instance, through their impact on water resources, are expected 
to play opposite roles in agriculture: droughts should reduce agricultural production while 
floods may increase it. To a lesser extent, droughts and floods may also impact industrial 
growth by reducing (increasing) the supply of agricultural products that serve as inputs to 






particularly in places where hydropower is a major source of electricity. By the same 
token, some earthquakes may also have a positive impact on industrial growth. Although 
earthquakes destroy buildings, infrastructure, and factories, in the short term, they may 
increase productivity in the long term to the extent that capital is replaced by a vintage of 
better. 
 
A two sector model of growth 
In this section I present a two sector model of growth with one consumption good. 
This is a relatively standard model of growth. The production technologies in the two 
sectors take the Cobb-Douglas form, and preferences are standard. The main purpose of 
the model is to provide an analytical framework to analyze the effect of different shocks 
on growth. Shocks differ in the sense that their direct impact bears diverse implications 
across the different sectors of the economy. Given the structure of the model, in order to 
simplify the analysis it seems reasonable to assume a closed economy.   
 
Preferences 
There is a representative household who lives infinite periods. For simplicity, I 
assume the size of the household is constant. The household supplies labor to the two 
sectors and uses its wage compensation to consume a final goods: a composite good 






β ,        (1) 
where β is the subjective discount factor, ct is a composite consumption good derived 






   
    Endowments 
In each period the household is endowed with one unit of time, all of which is 
devoted to work. Also, the household is endowed with initial capital stock at time 0 and 
the total land for the economy. I normalize the size of land to 1 and assume that land does 
not depreciate. 
itat nn +=1 ,        (2) 
where nat and nIt represent the amount of time that the household spends working in the 
agricultural sector and industrial sector respectively. 
 
    Technologies 
    Agriculture: 
    The agricultural good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with labor (nat) and land (L) as the only inputs.  
αα −= 1tatt LAnx  ,       (3) 




The industrial (and service) sector produce output using standard Cobb-Douglas 
production functions with capital, labor and agricultural goods as inputs.  






The industrial sector's output is used for consumption (ct) of the composite good 
and to accumulate capital (invest). The law of motion of the capital stock in the economy 
is given by: 
tttt kcyk δ−−=
& ,       (5) 
where δ is the depreciation rate. Equation (5) is a differential equation and plays a key 
role in the model because it shows how the capital stock, which represents the engine of 
growth, changes over time. 
 
Solution Method 
There is a social planner that maximizes utility of the representative household 
(1), subject to constraints (2) to (5). Note that c, na, ni are control variables and k, A and 
B are state variables of the problem. If we let λ be the co-state variable for k, we can 
write the current value hamiltonian as: 
( )[ ]kcLnAnBkcuH ttitittt δλ φγααφγ −−−+= −−− 11)1()( . 
The FOC for this problem are: 
λ=)(' tcu ,        (6) 
( ) 11 )1(1 −− −−−= itit nn φγαφ ,       (7)   
( )[ ]δγλλβλ φγααφγ −−=+− −−−− 111 )1( tititt LnAnBk& .   (8) 
Combining the derivative of (6) with respect to time with (8) yields: 




















The second dynamic equation is given by the law of motion of capital: 
tttittt kcxnBkk δ
φγφγ −−= −−1& . 
Assuming ccu ln)( = , we have a dynamic system of equations: 







,   (9) 
tttt kcABkk δ
φγγ −−Φ= −−1& ,       (10) 
where φγααφ −−−−=Φ 11 ])1[( tii Lnn . 
This model, which is almost identical to the one sector Ramsey model, is 
interesting for its predictions about the behavior of the growth rates and other variables 
along the transition path, from a given initial stock of capital (k0) to its steady-state level 
of capital (kss), and is also very useful to analyze the dynamics that follow after shocks 
hitting the economy.  
I now proceed to fully characterize the qualitative behavior of the dynamic system 
in the (k; c) plane. The phase-diagram in Figure 1, shows the nature of the dynamics of 
the model. Since, the rest of the variables are functions of (k; c) we don't need to pay 
attention to them. To construct the phase diagram, we first draw the: 0=c&  and 0=k&  
curves. To obtain these curves, I first set 0=c& , which defines the first loci. We see that 
there are two ways for 0=c& : c=0, which corresponds to the horizontal axis in Figure 1, 




















Here, we should note that when k<kss, c>0, that is, when the capital stock is 
below its steady-state value, consumption of industrial goods is increasing. On the other 
hand, when k>kss, c<0, in words, when the capital stock is above its steady-state value, 
consumption of industrial goods is decreasing. 
    The second step in the construction of the phase-diagram is to find the 
0=k& loci. It can be seen from equation (10) that 0=k&  if: 
 
kxnBkc δφγφγ −= −−1 .       (12) 
 Note that when present capital is close to zero, the derivative of c with respect to 
k goes to infinity and when present capital goes to infinity, the derivative converges to a 


















The next step is to linearize this dynamic system around the steady state. The 














































The determinant of the matrix associated with the linear approximation is 
negative: 
0)1( 21 <Φ−−=∆ −−− γφγγγ kBA  
Since the determinant is the product of the two roots, a negative determinant 






only one stable arm that is upward-sloping. Given that the only predetermined variable is 
k, the system exhibits saddle path stability. As shown in the picture, this means that for a 
given value of k0, c0 will adjust so as to position the system along the saddle path. 
     
Effects of Natural Disasters: An Analytical Illustration 
In this sub-section I use the model to examine, analytically, the effect of different 
types of shocks (Natural Disasters). I start by analyzing a shock that reduces the capital 
stock of the economy. Since this type of shocks affect capital, it only has implications for 
the Industrial sector. As I will explain latter, Earthquakes belong to this group of shocks. 
Then I go on to study the effect of events that affect the productivity of the agricultural 
sector and also a combination of shocks. In later sections I'll make the argument that most 
Natural Disasters belong to one of these categories, and thus the following exercise 
provides an analytical framework to understand the empirical results. 
Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady-state given by point A in 
Figure 2 There is then an "unanticipated" shock that reduces the capital stock of the 
economy. In Figure 2, I show how the economy will respond. With the help of the phase-
diagram, we can find out the behavior of consumption and the capital stock. The first 
thing to notice is that this event does not change the steady-state. As equations (11) and 
(12) make clear, the steady-state values of consumption and capital do not depend on the 
current capital stock. 
Note that on impact, the economy's capital stock falls. In terms of the phase 
diagram depicted in Figure 2, the capital stock jumps from kss to a point such as k0. 






event, so that the system lies along the saddle path. Hence, on impact, the system jumps 
for point A to Point B in Figure 2. The system then travels back to the unchanged steady-
state (point A). The corresponding time paths of consumption and capital stock are also 
depicted in the diagram. Given that the capital stock is increasing, output is growing. The 
fall in consumption leads to an increase in investment which diminishes over time as 
consumption and the capital stock return to its initial level. 
Other shocks that are related to this paper are the ones that affect the productivity 
in the agricultural sector. The two Natural Disasters that fit in this category are Droughts 
and Floods. 
Suppose again that the economy is initially in the steady-state given by point A in 
Figure 3, Panel (a) and that at t = 0, there is an unanticipated event that lowers the 
productivity of the agricultural sector, in particular assume that there is a shock that 
reduces A (increases A in Panel (b)). How is the steady-state affected? From (11) and 
(12), it follows that both steady-state consumption and steady-state capital stock fall 
(increase in Panel (b)). Intuitively, since the productivity in the agricultural sector is 
lower (higher), output will go down and production in the non-agricultural sector will 
also be affected because of the decrease in intermediate inputs (the opposite direction 
when Panel (b)). With fewer (more) resources, the non-agricultural sector will produce a 
lower (higher) level of output. The new steady-state will be thus at a point like B in 
Figure 3. How does the economy go from point A to point B? On impact, the capital 
stock cannot jump. Hence, the economy must jump on impact from point A to point C to 
position itself along the saddle path. It then travels over time from point C towards point 






Panels (a) and (b). The consumption paths implies that the economy will disinvest 
(invest) over time. To get rid of the unwanted stock of capital (augment the stock of 
capital in the case of Panel (b)), during the transition the economy will consume an 
amount higher (lower) than the implied by the new steady-state and output will be 
growing at a positive (negative) rate. 
Finally, I analyze the effect of a shock that reduces the stock of capital but also 
affects productivity of the industrial sector. In particular, assume that there is a shock that 
destroys a small amount of capital but also diminishes A, which seem to replicate the 
effect of Storms. This shock is a combination of the first two analyzed above. On impact, 
the reduction in the stock of capital moves the economy away from its initial steady-state, 
but by affecting productivity, the steady-state is also affected. The overall effect on 
growth depends on whether the current capital stock is below or above the new steady-
state. As shown in Figure 4, if after the impact the capital stock is above the new steady-
state level, the economy will position the system along the new saddle path, and capital 
will decrease on time until it reaches the new steady state. During the transition, output 
growth will be negative, the economy will be disinvesting. 
While this section has highlighted theoretical circumstances under which, in 
principle, disasters can have a positive impact on growth, the extent to which they 
actually do so remains an empirical question that is explored in the next sections. A last 
theoretical point should however be raised before proceeding with the empirics. The 
larger the disaster, the less likely it is that it will have a positive impact on growth. This is 
because large disasters that annihilate much of the infrastructure and civic ability to 






the short and medium term. The empirical analysis will therefore distinguish between the 
impacts of moderate versus major disasters. 
 
Estimation Methodology 
In this section I present the empirical strategy used to identify the impact of 
different types of natural disasters on the growth rates of GDP per capita and sectoral 
GDP per capita. The point of departure is a standard growth regression equation designed 
for estimation using (cross-country, time-series) panel data: 
 ,,2,11,01,, tiittititititi NDCVyyy εηµβββ +++++=− −−   (3.1) 
Where the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively; y is 
the log of output per capita, CV is a set of growth control variables, and ND represents 
natural disasters; µt and ηi denote unobserved time- and country-specific effects, 
respectively; and ε is the error term.  The dependent variable (yi,t-yi,t-1) is the average rate 
of real output growth (i.e., the log difference of output per capita normalized by the 
length of the period).  
I include controls and country and year fixed effects to control for differences 
between developing and OECD countries, which likely suffer different magnitudes of 
shocks. The controls CVi,t, are included to capture transitory shocks (such as terms of 
trade shocks) that confound the correlation between output and natural disasters. For 
example, a country that suffered from negative terms of trade shocks might have a 
significantly stronger negative correlation between natural disasters and growth vis a vis 






mean that the relation between natural disasters and growth is different in these countries. 
The specific controls used will be further discussed in the next section. 
The coefficient of interest is β2, which measures the partial correlation of output 
and natural disasters. The challenge is to obtain a consistent and precise estimate of β2, 
and examines differences between high-income and developing countries. 
This task is not straightforward. We start by estimating the model using OLS 
including country and time dummies. However, when the model is estimated using OLS, 
serious problems could arise. First, reverse causality could generate biases in estimation 
of β2, of given that economic growth can affect the impact and intensity of future natural 
disasters. In addition, estimating the dynamic panel model presented above presents an 
additional complication described by Nickell (1981). A methodology that deals with 
country specific effects, dynamic panel bias and endogeneity is the GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator works in the following way: 
After accounting for time-specific effects, equation 3.1 can be rewritten as:  
tiitititi Xyy ,,1,,  εηβα +++= −   (3.2) 
 
with Xi,t including CVi,t and NDi,t.  To eliminate the country-specific effect, take first 
differences of equation 3.2:  
( ) ( ) ( )y y y y X Xi t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t, , , , , , , ,'− = − + − + −− − − − −1 1 2 1 1α β ε ε  (3.3) 
First differencing gets rid of the country specific effects, but leads by construction 
to a correlation between the differenced lagged fiscal variable and the differenced error 
term. Furthermore, this step does not solve the problem of reverse causality. Thus, 






Following Levine, Loayza, Beck (2000) and Dollar and Kraay (2004), the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of 
panel data introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond 
(1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) are used to control for country-specific effects 
and joint endogeneity in this dynamic panel growth regression model. These estimators 
are based, first, on differencing regressions to control for (time invariant) unobserved 
effects and, second, on using previous observations of explanatory and lagged-dependent 
variables as instruments (which are called internal instruments).  
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. Two specification 
tests are run to verify this. The first is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, 
which tests the validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model.  The second test examines whether the original error term (that is, 
ti ,ε  in equation (3.2)) is serially correlated.  The model is supported when the null 
hypothesis is not rejected.5 See the appendix for more details on the GMM methodology. 
  
Growth Determinants and Natural Disasters 
To perform the estimations, a pooled cross-country and time-series data panel is 
compiled covering 94 developing and developed countries over the period 1961-2005.  
                                                 
5 In the system specification, it is in fact tested whether the first-differenced error term (that is, the residual 
of the equation in differences) is second-order serially correlated.  First-order serial correlation of the 
differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter 
follows a random walk.  Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the 






The data are organized in non-overlapping five-year periods, with each country having at 
most 9 observations.  The panel is unbalanced, with some countries having more 
observations than others. Appendices 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of the variables 
both for the pooled sample and developing countries only. Appendix 3 presents a matrix 
of pair-wise correlations of these variables. All data except the data on natural disasters 
are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007). 
Four dependent variables are considered. For comparison with other studies, 
regressions are first run using the growth rate of real per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as the dependent variable.  Subsequently regressions use the growth rate of real 
per capita value added in the three major sector of the economy, that is, agriculture, 
industry and services.  All of them are measured as the five-year average of the log 
differences of per capita output (in 2000 US dollars).  Per capita output is obtained by 
dividing the value added of each sector by the total population.    
Three groups of growth determinants are considered: 1) variables that measure 
transitional convergence, structural and stabilization policies, and institutions; 2) 
variables that proxy the role of external conditions affecting growth performance; and 3) 
natural disasters, which form the subject matter of the paper.   To control for transitional 
convergence, in each regression the corresponding initial value of output per capita (in 
logs) for the five-year period is used. This is crucial to test whether the initial position of 
the economy is important for its subsequent growth, all things equal. A negative sign 
would suggest that poor economies tend to catch up and grow faster than rich economies.   
Similar to the cross-country growth specifications by Levine, Loayza, Beck 






development, monetary and fiscal policy, and trade openness to capture the role of 
structural and stabilization policies, and institutions. Education is proxied by the log of 
the gross enrollment rate in secondary school, which is the ratio of the number of students 
enrolled in secondary school to the number of persons of the corresponding age. 
Financial depth is measured by the ratio of private domestic credit supplied by private 
financial institutions to GDP.  The fiscal burden is measured as the ratio of general 
government consumption to GDP.  Openness to international trade is proxied by the 
volume of trade (exports and imports) divided by GDP.  
The consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate is a proxy for macroeconomic 
stabilization, with high inflation being associated with bad macroeconomic policies. 
Financial depth, the government consumption ratio, trade openness, and the inflation rate6 
enter the growth regressions as the log of the average for the corresponding five-year 
period. All these control variables are assumed to be either predetermined (independent 
of current disturbances, but they may be influenced by past ones) or endogenous and thus 
correlated with current realizations of the error term, one of the main reasons for using 
the GMM procedure outlined above. Specifically, regarding the difference regression 
corresponding to the periods t and t-1, the following instruments are used:  for the 
variables measured as period averages--financial depth, government spending, inflation, 
and trade openness-- the instrument corresponds to the average of period t-2; for the 
variables measured as initial values--per capita output and secondary school enrollment-- 
the instrument corresponds to the observation at the start of period t-1. 
With regard to the second group of growth determinants, the regressions include 
two variables that are assumed to be strictly exogenous: shocks to the terms of trade and 
                                                 






period-specific dummies. Terms of trade shocks are measured by the growth rate of terms 
of trade (export prices relative to import prices) over each five-year period. The idea is to 
capture shifts in the demand for a country’s exports, and since terms of trade depend 
mainly on world conditions, it is assumed to be exogenous to contemporaneous growth of 
per capita GDP of a particular country. We include period-specific dummies to capture 
the impact of other global shocks to growth across countries.  
Finally, data for natural disasters were obtained from the Emergency Disasters 
Database (EM-DAT).  EM-DAT is a worldwide database on disasters maintained by 
CRED with the sponsorship of the United States Agency for International Development’s 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). It contains data on the occurrence and 
effects of more than 17,000 disasters in the world from 1900 to the present. The database 
is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. 
CRED defines a disaster as “a situation or event which overwhelms local 
capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external 
assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction 
and human suffering.” For a disaster to be entered into the database, at least one of the 
following criteria must be fulfilled: 10 or more people reported killed; 100 or more 
people reported affected; declaration of a state of emergency; or call for international 
assistance.  
CRED divides disasters according to type (for example: drought, flood, etc), and 
provides the dates when the disaster occurred and ended; the number of casualties 






injured (suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness requiring immediate 
medical treatment as a direct result of a disaster), and the number of people affected. 
People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency 
(i.e. requiring basic survival assistance such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and 
immediate medical help). People reported injured or homeless are aggregated with those 
affected to produce the “total number of people affected”. 
Finally, EM-DAT also provides an estimate of “economic damage”. Although 
“economic damage” could be a good indicator of the gravity of a disaster, it has 
important drawbacks both from a measurement and estimation perspective. First, CRED 
admits that there is no standard procedure to determine economic impact. Second, 
economic losses are reported for only one third of the disasters, with the proportion 
differing substantially across the types of disasters.7 Third, such a measure would make 
the exogeneity assumption tenuous, as the amount of damage may be correlated with the 
growth during the period under consideration.  
Four types of disasters will be considered: droughts, floods, storms and 
earthquakes. In particular, for each of these disasters the log of the sum of the total 
number of people affected in each event over the five -year period, divided by the total 





















where j indexes the number of events that took place in country i during (five-year) 
                                                 
7 For example, economic losses are reported for nearly 50% of all the windstorms entered in EM-DAT and 
40% of the earthquakes. This is most likely due to the infrastructure damage that is directly and clearly 
attributable to these events. Floods are the third largest category, with losses reported for about one-third of 
the total events. For droughts, on the other hand, less than 25% of the events have losses reported. There 
may be several factors for this. In particular, CRED recognizes that droughts may only draw the 
international attention in terms of lives lost, with little consideration for economic costs. Droughts do not 
result in infrastructure or shelter damage but in heavy crop and livestock losses, therefore, most economic 






period t.  By considering the sum of the number of people affected per event, the measure 
explicitly accounts for both the frequency and the intensity of the shock, contrary to many 
of the measures used in the literature.  To enable comparison across countries, further 
normalization by the total population is undertaken to correct for differences in 
population size. 
Inspection of the distribution of the weighted sum of natural disasters shows that 
it is positively skewed. Consequently the log is taken to avoid that the empirical results 
are driven by extreme values.  Not to lose too many observations (observations for which 
no event has been reported result in an undefined value of the log of the disaster 
measure), these observations are assigned a value of to -20, which is just below the 
lowest observation for which an event was reported.8  Finally, natural disasters such as 
storms and floods often occur in tandem—Appendix 3 indicates a correlation of 0.22 
between floods and storms, and a correlation of 0.24 between floods and earthquakes. To 
isolate the effects of each natural disaster, the four natural disaster measures are included 
simultaneously in the regressions.  
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the basic estimation results using the full sample and simple 
OLS.  The results in the first two columns pertain to the growth rate of GDP per capita, 
while those in the last three columns pertain to per capita value added growth rates in 
agriculture, industry, and services, respectively. The same set of explanatory variables is 
                                                 







included as control variables across all regressions, except that initial output corresponds 
either to GDP or to the initial value-added of the respective sector.   
The empirical results corresponding to the standard growth determinants (see 
Table 1, columns 1 and 2) are broadly consistent with the literature. Educational 
investment, depth of financial intermediation, and trade openness have positive and 
significant coefficients. Government consumption and price inflation, on the other hand, 
carry negative coefficients, indicating the harmful consequence of a large fiscal burden 
and macroeconomic price instability.  More favorable terms of trade (representing 
external shocks) tend to improve economic growth performance.   
The period dummies (not shown in the tables to save space) indicate that the 
international trend in economic growth experienced a declining drift over 1960-2000, 
resulting in a less favorable external environment in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 
previous decades.  Perhaps surprisingly, initial output per capita is not significant.  
Important changes in the most recent decade regarding the roles of macroeconomic 
volatility and public infrastructure may explain why some of the results appear to differ 
from the previous literature. Most importantly, the results regarding the growth effects of 
natural disasters are robust to these alternative specifications of the traditional growth 
control variables. 
Turning to the growth effects of natural disasters, natural disasters are found not 
to affect GDP growth when using a combined index of natural disasters—the sign of the 
coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant (Col. 1).  The lack of a significant 
effect reflects well the theoretical ambiguity and the diverging empirical findings 






(col 2), coefficients of contrasting signs emerge (negative for droughts, earthquakes and 
storms, and positive for floods).  However, except for floods, the coefficients fail to be 
statistically significant.  To better understand how different disasters affect growth (and 
also poverty), further disaggregation of growth by economic activity is warranted.    
In contrast to the weak effects on overall GDP growth, two types of natural 
disasters appear statistically relevant for the growth of agricultural output (Col. 3): 
droughts carry negative coefficients, while floods have a positive impact.  On the other 
hand, the effects on industrial and service output growth are rather weak for the sample of 
all countries.  In the case of industrial and service growth (Col. 4 and 5), floods are the 
only natural disaster that carries a significant coefficient, with a positive.   
When looking at the sample of developing countries only (Table 2), the growth 
effects of natural disasters are stronger in significance and, in some cases, magnitude, but 
qualitatively the same results hold. 
Now we turn our attention to Tables 3-A and 3-B. As explained earlier, the OLS 
regression presented above poses some challenges for estimation. Some of them were 
handled by using country and period specific fixed effects. However, these fixed effects 
do not address the problem that most of the explanatory variables are likely to be jointly 
determined with economic growth. So to eliminate biases resulting from simultaneity or 
reverse causation, I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators 
developed for dynamic models of panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995).   
Under GMM, the statistically significant results are a subset of those under the 






but the latter are more precise particularly in the cases of earthquakes and storms. In 
particular, when we concentrate only on developing countries (Table 3-B), the results 
become richer and more interesting. Before focusing on developing country results in 
more detail, it is important to highlight that the Hansen specification and serial-
correlation tests indicate that the null hypothesis of correct specification cannot be 
rejected, lending support to the findings.  This also holds across the different follow up 
regressions presented in Tables 3-A to 5. 
As with OLS, the coefficient on disasters is positive but insignificant when 
neither GDP growth nor the index of natural disasters is disaggregated by sector or type 
(Table 3-B, Col. 1).  As before, the results gain significance and diversity once 
disaggregated.  When the four types of natural disasters are considered individually but 
jointly in the regression, both droughts and floods appear to have a significant effect on 
per capita GDP growth, with droughts decreasing and floods raising growth (Col. 2).   
The effects on agricultural growth are given in column 3.  As in the full sample, 
droughts and floods have the largest but opposite effects. The impact of droughts is 
clearly negative on agricultural growth while that of floods is positive, though somewhat 
smaller than that for the sample as a whole. Interestingly, holding constant droughts and 
floods, the effect of storms is negative and significant for agricultural growth.  This 
would imply that when the provision of water is controlled for, the plant destruction 
borne by storms is harm for agriculture.   
Although the empirical analysis does not allow discerning the mechanisms 
through which the growth effects of natural disasters are realized, two channels identified 






effects of natural disasters on agricultural growth.  The first channel through which 
disasters affect agricultural growth relates to the provision of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs:  if an event decreases the availability of inputs (such as water, 
seedlings or unharvested plants/fruits on the fields for farming), it is likely to have a 
negative growth effect, and vice versa.  The second channel is related to Total Factor 
Productivity and capital: if an event destroys public infrastructure (say, water dams or 
irrigation canals) or any other productivity determinant, its growth effect is likely to be 
negative.   
Given the critical importance of water for agriculture, the strong negative effect of 
droughts on agricultural growth does not come as a surprise and is consistent with the 
evidence from growth studies based on micro-household data (Dercon, 2004; 
Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005).  Similarly, storms can have devastating effects on 
harvests by destroying seedlings and/or unharvested products on the field as well as 
irrigation infrastructure. 
Viewed from this perspective, the positive effect of floods on growth comes a bit 
as a surprise. Too much water is clearly damaging.  Yet, when floods are localized, they 
may be associated with plentiful supply of water nationwide, which would positively 
affect agriculture both directly and through the collection of irrigation water, and the net 
result may be a positive overall effect of floods on agricultural growth, or at worst no 
effect or a small negative one if floods are more widespread and severe.9  Given the much 
higher frequency of reported flood events (30 percent) in the data compared to drought 
                                                 
9 Both Pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects regressions (whose results are available upon request) confirm the 
positive and significant association between annual rainfall (relative to the corresponding country average) 






events (only 8 percent, see Appendix 2B), it is indeed quite plausible that the reported 
floods are often moderate floods and also associated with abundant rainfall nationwide.   
The impacts of disasters on the growth of industrial output are evaluated in 
column 4.  Unlike for the full sample, droughts and floods have significant and opposite 
effects on industrial growth.  Although the effects are analogous to the case of 
agriculture, their mechanisms are likely different.  First, the provision of water (or lack 
thereof) is often a crucial input in industrial growth but for a different reason than 
agriculture, in that mater, in that matter often determines the electricity generating 
capacity of the country.   
A second mechanism through which droughts and floods affect industrial growth 
relates to the inter-sector linkages between agriculture and industry.  These (forward and 
backward) linkage effects are typically stronger from agriculture to non-agriculture and 
they are also stronger in agriculture based developing countries than in industry and 
service based developed economies, consistent with the observed absence of an effect of 
droughts and floods on industrial growth when looking at the full  sample. In developing 
countries agricultural sectors make up a larger share of the economy and industrial 
production is often more dependent on agro-processing and thus inputs from agriculture 
(for example, cotton for textiles and grapes for wines).   Similarly, robust agricultural 
growth fosters the demand for intermediate inputs (such as tools and fertilizer) produced 
by the industrial sector (so-called forward linkages).  Meanwhile, backward linkages, 
which happen through the increased demand for (income elastic) locally produced goods 
and services following a widely shared increase in income, may be an even more 






developing countries (Tiffin and Irz, 2006; Haggblade, Hazell, and Dorosh, 2007).  The 
importance of hydropower and the existence of intersectoral linkages explains why 
natural disasters that improve or harm agricultural growth are likely to operate in the 
same direction for industrial growth, at least in developing countries.   
Perhaps surprisingly, both earthquakes and storms seem to lead to higher 
industrial growth.  In terms of damage resulting from natural disasters, earthquakes and 
storms are distinct in that their impact on physical capital is the strongest, relative to 
population affected.  Particularly in developing countries the damage to infrastructure 
inflicted by earthquakes and storms can be substantial due to lack of preparation.  As 
discussed above, if an event produces a sharp reduction in the capital-labor ratio, it is 
likely to be followed by higher growth.  The industrial sector stands to receive an 
additional growth boost from the demand for capital reconstruction that follows 
earthquakes and storms, from sectors including housing, infrastructure, and 
manufacturing.   
Lastly, the effects on the growth of service output are assessed in column 5.  In 
this case, only floods carry a significant coefficient, indicating a positive effect of floods 
on service value added growth.  Given that this sector includes commerce and retailing, 
among other cross-cutting economic activities, services have strong links with both 
agriculture and industry, especially in developing countries, as suggested by the larger 
coefficient for the sample of developing countries than for the full sample.  Therefore, the 
positive impact of floods may be partly the result of its beneficial impact on agricultural 






Another mechanism through which service growth may be affected by natural 
disasters is that relief resources and activities may increase the demand for service-related 
sectors, such as transport and communications, banking, and government.  This effect 
will tend to make the impact of all natural disasters on service value added more positive.  
Thus, in the case of floods, the positive effect of relief activities increases the beneficial 
spill-overs coming from increases in agriculture and industry.  This may also be the 
reason why the effect of droughts on service output growth is not statistically significant:  
the positive relief effect counteracts the negative spill-over effect coming from 
agriculture and industry.  Finally, unlike industry, services tend to be less intensive in 
physical capital, and more intensive in telecommunication and infrastructure. As a result, 
services are less likely to receive a growth stimulus from a decline in the capital/labor 
ratio, and more likely to suffer from a decline in total factor productivity following an 
earthquake or a storm.  
Next I check the robustness of the findings, using a different measure of disasters. 
In particular, I use a count (incidence) variable, commonly used in the literature to 
measure natural disasters (e.g. IMF, 2003; Becker and Mauro, 2006), rather than the 
continuous (intensity) variable used in the main specification.  The count variable used is 
the average number of events in the corresponding country and five-year window.  A 
natural disaster qualifies as an “event” if the number of people affected times 0.3 plus the 
number of casualties is greater than 0.01% of the population. 10  
The results for developing countries (Table 4) are remarkably similar to those 
obtained with the continuous measure of natural disasters.  In fact, for droughts and 
floods the results are the same, in terms of sign and statistical significance.  For 
                                                 






earthquakes and storms, the count or incidence variable fails to identify a significant 
effect on industrial growth.  As will be seen below, this reflects the fact that only 
moderate earthquakes and storms have a positive impact in industrial growth. Unlike the 
benchmark measure of disasters, the count variable does not contain enough information 
to discern the positive effects that result from most disasters.  
 
Are the effects of natural disasters linear?  
So far, the analysis has focused on the average effect of a disaster.  Yet, the 
intensity of different events varies substantially, and there is no reason a priori to believe 
that the effects of disasters should be linear. The simple specification used so far may be 
a good representation of the effects of the majority of natural disasters, but it may also 
distort the true effects of the most severe ones.  To examine this issue, the corresponding 
natural disaster measure is interacted with a dummy variable that has the value of 1 for 
the top 10% of natural disasters according to intensity, and 0 for the rest.  One interaction 
term per natural disaster is then added to the basic regression equation, which is 
estimated with the same methodology as before. Results are presented in Table 5. 
Coefficients on interaction terms are called “Droughts Severe”, “Floods Severe”, and so 
on. The coefficients on the simple disaster measures (“Droughts”, “Floods”, etc.) denote 
the effects of moderate disasters, and the sum of the coefficients on the simple measure 
and the interaction term indicate the effects of severe disasters.   
The results are revealing.  Severe events intensify the negative effect of droughts 
on agricultural growth by a factor of two.  In the case of floods, the positive effect 






aggregate GDP, agriculture, industry, and services growth disappear when floods are 
severe (the positive coefficient on the simple measure of floods is about the same size as 
the negative coefficient on the interaction term).  A similar result holds for earthquakes 
and storms in the case of industrial growth.  Both of these coefficients were significant in 
the basic specification.  Now, the simple measures of earthquakes and storms retain those 
positive coefficients, but their corresponding interaction terms are negative (and 
significantly so in the case of storms).  This implies that while moderate earthquakes and 
storms can have a beneficial “reconstruction” effect on industrial growth, severe events 
are so devastating that the best possible outcome is recovery to the sector’s initial 
position. Overall, any potential positive effects on growth from natural disasters appear to 
disappear when natural disasters are extreme.  
 
Are the effects of disasters quantitatively important?  
Finally, the question remains whether the natural disasters have an important 
impact quantitatively, both in terms of their effects on growth and their likely effects on 
the distribution of that growth.  To explore this, Table C presents the estimates of the 
annual growth effect in percentage points of a natural disaster of “typical” or median 
intensity, disaggregated by type of disaster and sector of economic activity.  The 
calculations are made using the point estimates of the coefficients, presented in Table 3-
B, and the median disaster intensities in the sample of developing countries, as reported 








Table C: Growth effect of a "typical" (median) natural disaster 
Droughts -0.606 *** -1.071 *** -1.029 ** -0.127
  
Floods 0.996 *** 0.802 *** 0.935 *** 0.911 ***
Earthquakes -0.091 0.091 0.938 * -0.071
Storms -0.093 -0.559 *** 0.838 * -0.207
Note:  The effects on growth are calculated using the coefficients reported in Table 2. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Effect on:












In developing countries, a typical drought produces a reduction of agricultural and 
industrial annual growth rate of the order of 1 percentage point, leading to a decline of 
GDP growth by 0.6 percentage points per year or 3 percentage points over a period of 5 
years.11  This compares with an average annual per capita growth rate in developing 
countries of 1.35 percent during the 1961-2005 period. A typical flood increases growth 
in each major sector by about 0.8-0.9 percentage points, producing an increase of GDP 
growth of around 1 percentage point.   A typical earthquake leads to a rise in industrial 
growth of about 0.9 percentage points, which, however, does not translate into an 
increase in aggregate growth.  Finally, a typical storm has a dual effect, reducing 
agricultural growth by 0.6 percentage points and increasing industrial growth by 0.8 
percentage points, which given the larger share of agriculture in developing economies 
results in a zero net effect on overall growth. 
                                                 






Clearly, the negative effects of droughts on aggregate and sectoral growth in 
developing countries can be substantial, while reports of moderate floods would in effect 
correspond to positive aggregate growth experiences (related to nationwide abundant 
rainfall).  Moreover, given that the elasticity of poverty with respect to GDP is much 
larger for growth originating in agriculture (Christiaensen and Demery, 2007; Ligon and 
Sadoulet, 2007) and in labor intensive (industrial) sectors (Loayza and Raddatz, 2006), 
the poor stand to be especially affected by natural disasters.  In particular, Christiaensen 
and Demery (2007) estimate that 1 percentage point of (aggregate) GDP growth 
originating in agriculture is on average about twice as effective in reducing 1$-day 
poverty than 1 percentage point of GDP growth originating outside agriculture, with an 
even larger difference for less developed countries.  As a result, the poor are likely to 
suffer disproportionately from droughts and storms, with their effects often felt many 
years thereafter, especially in case of severe droughts as in the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine 
(Dercon, 2004).  On the other hand, nationwide, the poor may also be benefiting 
disproportionately when moderate floods are reported.  To the extent that earthquakes 
and storms result in labor intensive reconstruction efforts, the poorer segments of the 
population could benefit as well.  While informative, these preliminary insights regarding 
the distributional effects of natural disasters must be tested further against the poverty 
data, an important agenda for future research. 
 
Estimating the short-run impact of epidemics  
To study the effect of natural disasters on economic growth in the short run, I use 






1961-2005. The panel is unbalanced, with some countries having more observations than 
others.  
The variables used in this section are a sub-set of the ones used in the medium and 
long-run analysis. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). To capture external conditions that may affect short-run 
growth, I control for the growth rate of the country’s Terms of Trade (TOT), to capture 
shifts in the demand for a country’s exports. As before, data for these variables were 
obtained from the World Bank (WDI, 2007). The last set of variables measures the 
impact of droughts, floods, earthquakes and storms on the growth rates of GDP per 
capita, agricultural value added, and non-agricultural value added. Throughout the 
exercise, I assume that natural disasters are exogenous with respect to the growth 
variables and shocks to terms of trade. 
 
Methodology 
I study the short-run effect of natural disasters using the panel data Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methodology. This technique combines the traditional VAR 
approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with panel-data 
techniques alowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity.12 Here I present a brief 
decription and the main intuition of the methodology.  
I specify a first-order three-variable VAR model as follows: 
 
 
                                                 















where zt=[z1t  z2t  z3t]; z1t is  the number of  natural disasters, z2t represent  terms 
of trade shocks and z3t is the growth rate of GDP per capita, which is my main variable of 
interest.  
I focus the analysis on the impulse-response functions, which describe the 
reaction of one variable in the system to the innovations in another variable in the system, 
holding all other shocks at zero. However, since the actual variance-covariance matrix of 
the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, to isolate shocks to one variabvle it is necessary to 
decompose the residuals in such a way that they become orthogonal. The usual 
convention is to adopt a particular ordering and allocate any correlation between the 
residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes first in the ordering. The 
identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in the ordering affect the 
later variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while the variables that come 
later only affect the earlier variables with a lag. Following this convention, I assume that: 
• Natural disasters have contemporaneous effects on GDP growth rates and terms 
of trade shocks; 
• Terms of trade shocks have contemporaneous effects on GDP growth rates; but 
not on natural disasters;  
• GDP growth shocks do not have any contemporaneous effect on the other two 
variables 
 In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, I need to impose the restriction that 
the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is 
likely to be violated in practice, one way to relax the restriction on parameters is to 






lags of the dependent variables, the mean differencing procedure commonly used to 
eliminate fixed effects will create biased coefficients. To avoid this problem I use 
forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the Helmert procedure (see Arellano and 
Bover 1995). This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the 
future observations available for each country-year. Since this transformation preserves 
the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, we use lagged 
regressors as instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM (see Appendix 
for more details). 
To analyze the impulse-response functions I need some estimate of their 
confidence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from 
the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. 
Hence, I use Monte Carlo simulation to generate their confidence intervals of the impulse 
response functions.  
 
Results from the Panel VAR 
In this section I describe the main results of the panel VAR methodology. The 
presentation of the results is organized in five figures, one for an all disaster shock and 
then one for each type of natural disaster. For each type of shock, I present the impulse 
responses for its effect on real per capita GDP [panel (a)], and its major components, 
agricultural [panel (b)] and non-agricultural value added per capita [panel (c)]. In every 
figure, the pictures on the left are obtained by using the sample of all countries and the 






Before we delve into the discussion of the results, it is important to remark that 
they are very similar using either of the samples (all countries or developing countries). 
However, most of the time, the effects seem to be stronger in the sample of developing 
countries, therefore, I put most of the attention on the pictures of the right hand side. 
As we did in the previous methodology when we looked at long-run growth, I 
start by looking at the effect of an “all disaster” shock on the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. Once again the effect is insignificant, which reflects the theoretical ambiguities 
and the contradictions of the received empirical literature. Hence, we turn to the 
disaggregated analysis which provides richer insight. 
In the previous analysis looking at five-year growth rates, we found that droughts 
had an overall negative effect on growth. The result of the impulse-responses presented in 
Figure 8 confirms this result and suggest that the initial impact is the most important. As 
suggested by the model presented in section 3, the effect of droughts can be explained by 
its direct impact in agriculture. Droughts have a strong negative impact on agriculture in 
the year of the event, which can not compensated by higher growth in subsequent years. 
This explains why we find a negative effect on the five year averages. Figure ?? also 
shows that through the inter-sectoral linkages presented in the model, this shock has a 
significant effect in non-agricultural sectors.  
Contrary to droughts and as shown in the previous methodology, floods seem to 
have a positive effect growth that can also be explained by the direct impact on 
agriculture. However, the reaction of growth to a flood occurs with some delay. The 
response of growth of GDP and agricultural value added is positive and significant in 






effects that may offset each other. On the one hand there is a portion of arable land (L) 
can not be used for production. In the model presented in section 3, this would imply a 
decrease in growth. On the other hand, this effect is compensated by an increase in 
productivity in other areas of the country that benefit from a higher supply of water. 
Hence, no significant effect is observed in the year of the event. However, in subsequent 
years when the flood is gone from areas more affected, we observe the “Nile effect”, that 
is an increase in productivity in every area. 
For earthquakes, the results are weaker in terms of statistical significance than in 
the case of droughts and floods. As figure 12 shows, earthquakes have no significant 
effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita and agricultural value added per capita. 
However, they seem to have a positive and significant effect for non-agricultural GDP, 
particularly for the sample of developing countries. This positive effect is consistent with 
the reconstruction activity that follows an earthquake in residential housing, public 
infrastructure and production plants. 
Finally, the results for storms are also consistent with the long-run methodology. 
Storms tend to have a negative and significant effect on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita and non-agricultural GDP in the year of the event. For developing countries, the 
effects on agricultural value added per capita are contradictory. While there seems to be a 
negative and significant effect the year after the shock, there is a positive effect two years 








The literature has so far remained inconclusive regarding the effects of natural 
disasters on growth.  While several studies point to negative effects, others report no 
effects or even positive effects of natural disasters on growth. Guided by insights from 
economic growth models on the channels through which natural disasters may affect 
economic growth, as well as the extensive literature on intersectoral linkages, this study 
went beyond the averages and explored the effects of natural disasters separately by 
disaster and economic sector in both developed and developing countries.  
Three major insights emerged.  First, disasters do affect economic growth – but 
not always negatively, and the effects differ substantially across disaster type and 
economic sector, confirming the gains from a richer disaggregated analysis that looks 
beyond the averages.  In particular, droughts are found to have a negative impact that is 
mainly observed in agricultue (and also industry in developing countries). Storms also 
lower agricultural growth, but increase industrial growth in developing countries.  
Similarly, earthquakes are found to bring about higher industrial growth in developing 
countries.  In contrast, moderate (though not severe) floods have on average a positive 
effect on agricultural growth, and even other sectors of the economy, likely because 
localized flooding reflects broader nationwide abundance of rainfall.  
Second, while moderate disasters can have a positive growth effect on certain 
sectors, severe disasters do not. The impact of the 10 percent largest disasters in any 
category is found to be either insignificant or negative. When a natural disaster is severe 






weakened.   This also holds for severe floods and clarifies the seemingly surprising 
positive effect of floods.  To the extent that reported floods are localized and reflective of 
more abundant national rainfall patterns, they would foster agriculture. Otherwise, the 
disruptions and damage caused by floods would cancel or outweigh the positive effects 
derived from plentiful rainfall.  
Third, growth is more sensitive to disasters in developing than developed 
countries—more sectors are affected and the magnitudes are larger and non-trivial. This 
is consistent with the more marked presence of inter-sectoral linkages, following the 
more prominent role that agriculture plays in developing countries.  Simulations indicate 
that a typical (median) drought reduces the annual per capita agricultural and industrial 
growth rate in developing countries by about 1 percentage point, resulting in a reduction 
of annual per capita overall GDP growth of 0.6 percentage points. A typical earthquake 
and storm increase industrial growth by about 1 percentage point each, consistent with 
the growth pattern predicted by theory when the capital labor ratio declines substantially, 
and further supported by the need for reconstruction following earthquakes and storms.   
As the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth generated in agriculture and labor 
intensive sectors (such as construction and manufacturing) is substantially higher than the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to growth generated in more capital intensive sectors, 
these results also suggest that the poor stand to be disproportionately affected. 
Clearly, the time path of recovery and adjustment varies by shock and sector, and 
these differences will likely be further affected by country-dependent institutional factors. 
Our findings also suggest the presence of linkages transmitting shocks across sectors (in 






these transmission mechanisms. While the cross-country analysis presented here provides 
estimates of the loss (or gain) in economic growth associated with different natural 
disasters, country case-studies will be needed to develop detailed policy 
recommendations that would ease recovery and adjustment.  Such analysis would also 
help shed further light on the distributional impact of disasters (both in terms of 
geographic impact, and impact across income categories) and thus the optimal targeting 



































































































































Growth and Major Natural Disasters
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Estimation Method: OLS Robust Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [0.823]
Droughts -0.012 -0.071*** -0.002 0.006
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.582] [-3.216] [-0.0747] [0.237]
Floods 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.060* 0.054**
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [3.389] [2.982] [1.779] [2.165]
Earthquakes -0.011 -0.007 0.002 -0.011
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.546] [-0.299] [0.0497] [-0.510]
Storms -0.025 -0.014 -0.042 -0.022
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-1.248] [-0.610] [-1.297] [-0.974]
Control Variables
Initial Output per capita -0.202 -0.147 -0.442 -0.453** -0.399***
[-1.558] [-1.059] [-1.562] [-2.402] [-2.658]
Education 1.059*** 1.041*** 0.789*** 1.108*** 1.387***
[4.932] [4.783] [3.081] [2.904] [4.843]
Financial Depth 0.563*** 0.511*** -0.129 0.740** 0.765***
[2.970] [2.606] [-0.627] [2.499] [3.292]
Government Burden -1.447*** -1.371*** 0.223 -2.023*** -1.192***
[-4.511] [-3.977] [0.528] [-3.591] [-2.798]
Inflation -3.657*** -3.898*** -1.436** -5.319*** -3.493***
[-4.654] [-4.719] [-2.184] [-4.273] [-3.834]
Trade Openness 0.418** 0.474** -0.467* 0.929*** 0.166
[2.241] [2.340] [-1.696] [2.808] [0.678]
Growth Rate TOT 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.085*** 0.039 0.105***
[2.803] [2.843] [3.230] [0.843] [4.017]
Constant 18.815*** 19.579*** 8.690** 28.379*** 18.182***
[4.718] [4.651] [2.351] [4.454] [3.884]
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
R-squared 0.287 0.307 0.114 0.220 0.257
Number of Countries 94 94 94 94 94
t-statistics in brackets








Growth and Major Natural Disasters Developing Countries only
Sample: 68 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Estimation Method: OLS Robust Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [0.682]
Droughts -0.013 -0.068*** 0.001 0.002
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.625] [-2.909] [0.0158] [0.0846]
Floods 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.082** 0.077***
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [3.684] [2.978] [2.040] [2.624]
Earthquakes -0.029 0.000 -0.019 -0.027
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-1.265] [0.00523] [-0.497] [-1.011]
Storms -0.027 -0.004 -0.051 -0.017
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-1.216] [-0.153] [-1.358] [-0.643]
Control Variables
Initial Output per capita -0.278 -0.217 -0.266 -0.540** -0.530***
[-1.645] [-1.191] [-0.777] [-2.363] [-2.661]
Education 0.919*** 0.894*** 0.385 0.975** 1.220***
[4.081] [3.860] [1.314] [2.250] [3.974]
Financial Depth 0.787*** 0.728*** 0.136 0.961*** 1.009***
[3.480] [3.095] [0.609] [2.721] [3.540]
Government Burden -1.457*** -1.364*** -0.090 -2.185*** -1.265**
[-3.788] [-3.434] [-0.190] [-3.381] [-2.502]
Inflation -3.441*** -3.574*** -0.949 -4.842*** -2.957***
[-4.238] [-4.277] [-1.385] [-3.647] [-3.013]
Trade Openness 0.355 0.463* -0.591* 1.007** 0.220
[1.520] [1.833] [-1.860] [2.431] [0.703]
Growth Rate TOT 0.060** 0.061** 0.088*** 0.035 0.102***
[2.415] [2.505] [3.226] [0.692] [3.609]
Constant 17.706*** 17.671*** 7.190** 25.654*** 15.823***
[4.542] [4.367] [1.984] [3.867] [3.312]
Observations 407 407 407 407 407
R-squared 0.276 0.307 0.129 0.222 0.259
Number of Countries 68 68 68 68 68
t-statistics in brackets








Growth and Major Natural Disasters
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Estimation Method: System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [0.602]
Droughts -0.016 -0.056** 0.009 0.008
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-1.137] [-2.330] [0.467] [0.550]
Floods 0.062*** 0.090*** 0.033 0.056***
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [3.659] [4.392] [1.163] [2.881]
Earthquakes 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [0.157] [-0.0881] [-0.154] [-0.0381]
Storms -0.002 -0.046** -0.039 -0.011
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.0926] [-2.053] [-1.127] [-0.474]
Control Variables
Initial Output per capita 0.102 0.147 -0.856 -0.329 -0.138
[0.348] [0.475] [-1.525] [-0.747] [-0.465]
Education 1.292** 0.976* 2.424*** 1.477 2.412***
[2.343] [1.698] [4.136] [1.451] [5.621]
Financial Depth 0.342* 0.282 -0.383 0.393 0.252
[1.751] [1.447] [-1.198] [1.146] [0.959]
Government Burden -3.056*** -2.691*** -0.935 -4.182*** -3.022***
[-5.154] [-4.379] [-1.468] [-4.402] [-3.850]
Inflation -4.311*** -3.830*** -3.979*** -7.342*** -4.100***
[-3.841] [-3.480] [-3.168] [-3.670] [-3.799]
Trade Openness 0.884 1.758** 1.159 1.469 1.400
[1.412] [2.608] [1.349] [1.379] [1.640]
Growth Rate TOT 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053** 0.038 0.079***
[3.256] [3.451] [2.367] [1.050] [4.300]
Constant 21.639*** 16.828** 14.919** 39.856*** 17.775**
[2.995] [2.340] [2.245] [3.335] [2.468]
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
Number of id 94 94 94 94 94
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.401 0.261 0.115 0.159 0.302
Hansen 0.744 0.801 0.789 0.574 0.155
t-statistics in brackets
















Growth and Major Natural Disasters - Developing Cuntries only
Sample: 68 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Estimation Method: System GMM













     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.0899]
Droughts -0.043*** -0.078*** -0.072** -0.007
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-2.939] [-4.070] [-2.213] [-0.360]
Floods 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.072** 0.071***
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [4.665] [4.039] [2.612] [4.061]
Earthquakes -0.006 0.002 0.081* -0.006
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.219] [0.0855] [1.656] [-0.191]
Storms -0.012 -0.057*** 0.070 -0.016
     intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.460] [-2.797] [1.485] [-0.540]
Control Variables
Initial Output per capita 0.152 -0.053 0.002 -2.321** 0.014
[0.319] [-0.101] [0.00247] [-2.514] [0.0283]
Education 0.448 0.306 1.702*** -0.218 1.782***
[0.731] [0.551] [2.878] [-0.209] [3.030]
Financial Depth 0.679*** 0.420* -0.182 0.732* 0.458
[2.924] [1.785] [-0.588] [1.838] [1.614]
Government Burden -3.573*** -3.500*** -1.063* -6.417*** -3.490***
[-5.466] [-5.472] [-1.807] [-6.339] [-5.232]
Inflation -6.483*** -5.850*** -3.693*** -5.293*** -3.107**
[-5.174] [-4.750] [-4.806] [-2.790] [-2.565]
Trade Openness 1.189* 1.757** -0.401 4.923*** 2.721***
[1.827] [2.502] [-0.664] [5.017] [3.182]
Growth Rate TOT 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.075*** 0.055** 0.068***
[2.771] [3.218] [4.017] [2.399] [2.895]
Constant 32.141*** 29.737*** 16.209*** 37.912*** 9.214
[4.347] [3.941] [3.135] [3.517] [1.314]
Observations 407 407 407 407 407
Number of id 68 68 68 68 68
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.360 0.151 0.171 0.631 0.225
Hansen 0.290 0.417 0.195 0.455 0.296
t-statistics in brackets






















Incidence of Natural Disasters: Developing Countries 
Sample: 68 developing countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations) 
Estimation Method: System GMM 
Natural Disaster Variables: 
All Disasters  -0.090 
       avg. number of events 1 [-0.383] 
Droughts  -2.084 *** -2.966 *** -2.733 *** -0.737 
       avg. number of events 1 [-4.045] [-3.716] [-2.587] [-1.118] 
Floods  1.048 *** 1.254 *** 1.078 ** 1.627 *** 
       avg. number of events 1 [3.674] [4.025] [2.202] [6.235] 
Earthquakes  -0.890 0.717 1.035 -1.190 
       avg. number of events 1 [-1.264] [0.745] [0.632] [-1.516] 
Storms -0.754 *** -0.778 *** -0.279 -0.819 *** 
       avg. number of events 1 [-3.766] [-4.910] [-0.604] [-2.839] 
Control Variables: 
Initial Output per capita 2 0.551 0.265 0.207 -1.561 * 0.110 
       in logs [1.069] [0.488] [0.305] [-1.807] [0.221] 
Education 0.002 0.079 1.807 ** -1.451 1.597 *** 
       secondary school enrollment rate, in logs [0.004] [0.123] [2.483] [-1.361] [2.934] 
Financial Depth 0.769 *** 0.641 *** -0.389 1.131 ** 0.523 ** 
       private credit/GDP, in logs [3.685] [3.293] [-1.296] [2.397] [2.178] 
Government Burden -3.495 *** -3.366 *** -0.512 -5.869 *** -3.200 *** 
       government consumption/GDP, in logs [-5.857] [-5.355] [-0.990] [-5.792] [-5.028] 
Inflation  -6.308 *** -5.626 *** -3.553 *** -4.833 *** -2.692 *** 
       100+%Growth rate of CPI, in logs [-5.340] [-5.611] [-5.669] [-3.073] [-3.089] 
Trade Openness 1.102 * 1.138 -0.833 4.363 *** 2.171 *** 
       (exports+imports)/GDP, in logs [1.695] [1.585] [-1.479] [4.021] [2.897] 
Growth rate of Terms of Trade 0.048 *** 0.037 ** 0.066 *** 0.043 0.066 *** 
       log differences of terms of trade index [3.179] [2.466] [3.249] [1.571] [3.413] 
Constant 29.693 *** 28.094 *** 16.364 *** 32.030 *** 7.771 
[4.061] [4.214] [3.589] [3.213] [1.412] 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of Countries 68 68 68 68 68 
Number of Instruments 47 50 50 50 50 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 0.371 0.144 0.167 0.758 0.391 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 0.328 0.388 0.497 0.485 0.314 
Numbers in brackets are the corresponding t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Period fixed effects were included (coefficients not reported). 
1  
An event counts as 1 if affected > 0.01% of population. 
2  





















Severe Natural Disasters: Developing Countries 
Sample: 68 developing countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations) 
Estimation Method: System GMM 
Natural Disaster Variables: 
All Disasters 0.002 
       intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [0.0931] 
All Disasters Severe -0.043 * 
       All Disasters*Top 10% drought dummy [-1.673] 
Droughts  -0.035 ** -0.049 *** -0.035 -0.016 
       intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-2.361] [-2.896] [-1.147] [-0.797] 
Droughts Severe -0.025 -0.086 *** -0.026 0.037 
       Droughts*Top 10% drought dummy [-0.973] [-2.793] [-0.714] [1.332] 
Floods  0.105 *** 0.073 *** 0.100 *** 0.099 *** 
       intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [5.488] [4.252] [3.376] [4.581] 
Floods Severe -0.083 *** -0.038 * -0.091 ** -0.075 ** 
       Floods*Top 10% flood dummy [-3.072] [-1.739] [-2.222] [-2.048] 
Earthquakes  -0.028 0.005 0.081 * -0.003 
       intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-1.139] [0.171] [1.685] [-0.119] 
Earthquakes Severe 0.026 -0.012 -0.058 0.005 
       Earthquakes*Top 10% earthquake dummy [0.905] [-0.427] [-1.210] [0.150] 
Storms  -0.002 -0.062 *** 0.084 ** -0.010 
       intensity: log(avg. affected/population) [-0.0625] [-2.893] [2.021] [-0.280] 
Storms Severe -0.054 * 0.011 -0.143 ** -0.050 
       Storms*Top 10% storm dummy [-1.662] [0.527] [-2.410] [-1.370] 
Control Variables: 
Initial Output per capita 1 0.216 0.290 0.191 -1.411 * 0.195 
       in logs [0.409] [0.591] [0.244] [-1.883] [0.505] 
Education 0.315 0.333 1.539 ** 0.134 1.607 *** 
       secondary school enrollment rate, in logs [0.456] [0.548] [2.526] [0.127] [3.020] 
Financial Depth 0.629 *** 0.373 -0.176 0.316 0.497 * 
       private credit/GDP, in logs [2.867] [1.488] [-0.593] [0.657] [1.695] 
Government Burden -3.579 *** -3.380 *** -0.563 -5.922 *** -3.514 *** 
       government consumption/GDP, in logs [-5.891] [-5.827] [-0.981] [-6.450] [-5.443] 
Inflation  -6.356 *** -4.977 *** -3.067 *** -5.991 *** -2.933 ** 
       100+%Growth rate of CPI, in logs [-5.635] [-4.842] [-4.270] [-3.244] [-2.224] 
Trade Openness 1.228 ** 1.832 *** -0.520 4.486 *** 2.632 *** 
       (exports+imports)/GDP, in logs [2.021] [2.804] [-0.962] [4.648] [2.792] 
Growth rate of Terms of Trade 0.041 *** 0.046 *** 0.074 *** 0.025 0.065 *** 
       log differences of terms of trade index [2.671] [3.366] [3.882] [1.010] [2.829] 
Constant 31.305 *** 22.427 *** 13.460 *** 34.401 *** 7.343 
[4.604] [3.510] [2.741] [3.203] [0.949] 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 
Number of Countries 68 68 68 68 68 
Number of Instruments 48 54 54 54 54 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 0.332 0.247 0.204 0.663 0.229 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 0.394 0.669 0.322 0.444 0.311 
Numbers in brackets are the corresponding t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Period fixed effects were included (coefficients not reported). 
1  
Output corresponds to GDP, agricultural value added, industrial value added, and service value added, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 





























































Panel (a) - Response of Growth to Drought Shock
                 growth - drought
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Panel (b) - Response of Agricultural Growth to Drought Shock
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Panel (a) - Response of Growth to Floods Shock
All Countries Developing Countries
Panel (b) - Response of Agricultural Growth to Floods Shock
Panel (c) - Response of Non-Agricultural Growth to Floods Shock
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Panel (a) - Response of Growth to Earthquake Shock
All Countries Developing Countries
Panel (b) - Response of Agricultural Growth to Earthquake Shock
Panel (c) - Response of Non-Agricultural Growth to Earthquake Shock
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Panel (a) - Response of Growth to Storm Shock
All Countries Developing Countries
Panel (b) - Response of Agricultural Growth to Storm Shock
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                 g ro w th  - s t o rm
T im e  (y e a rs )
 ( p  1 0 )  s to rm  s to rm
 ( p  9 0 )  s to rm
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-0 .0 0 1 7
0 .0 0 1 2
                 g r o w th  -  s to r m
T im e  ( y e a r s )
 ( p  1 0 )  s to r m  s to r m
 ( p  9 0 )  s to r m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
- 0 .0 0 2 3
0 .0 0 2 0
                 ag rg row th  -  s to rm
T im e  (ye a rs )
 ( p  1 0 ) s to rm  s to rm
 ( p  9 0 ) s to rm
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-0 .0 0 30
0 .0 0 2 3
                 a g rg ro w th  -  s to rm
T im e  (y e a rs )
 ( p  1 0 )  s to r m  s to rm
 ( p  9 0 )  s to r m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-0 .0 0 4 3
0 .0 0 3 5
                 n o a g r o w th  -  s t o r m
T im e  (y e a rs )
 ( p  1 0 )  s to rm  s to rm
 ( p  9 0 )  s to rm
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-0 .0 0 2 0
0 .0 0 1 6
                 n o a g r o w th  -  s to r m
T im e  ( y e a r s )
 ( p  1 0 )  s to r m  s to r m
 ( p  9 0 )  s to r m
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
- 0 .0 0 2 7






Chapter 3: Do Epidemics Hurt or Help Economic Growth? 
 
Introduction 
While in Chapter 2 I have studied the role of natural disasters in explaining 
economic growth, in this paper I concentrate on the growth implications of epidemics. 
Specifically, this paper addresses the following questions: what is the effect of 
epidemics (sudden health crises) on economic growth? Are all epidemics the same in 
their impact on economic growth? Are the effects of epidemics different in the short-
run versus the long run? Answers to these questions matter for two main reasons. 
First, even moderate growth effects can have a huge impact on the welfare of future 
generations. Second, predicting the effects of these health crises is crucial to 
evaluating the usefulness of proposed policies to mitigate their economic effects. 
These questions have become even more relevant in recent months, as many 
have expressed concern about the potential economic consequences of the current 
swine flu epidemic.13 According to the World Health Organization, it took the A 
H1N1 virus less than six weeks to spread widely, while the Spanish flu in 1918 
needed more than six months to spread to the same extent. This is concerning 
considering that Barro and Ursua (2008) identify the Spanish Flu as the fourth worst 
macroeconomic event since 1870. However, many economists have shown 
                                                 
13 BNP Paribas, the World Bank and Brookings Institution, among others, have estimated the potential 





skepticism with respect to the potential effects of the swine flu epidemic.14 They 
argue that the swine flu is just the latest in a series of exogenous events in recent 
decades (including natural disasters, acts of terrorism and wars), that have had less 
economic impact than pessimists feared. 
The channels through which an epidemic might affect economic growth are 
numerous. In general, studies that find a negative effect of epidemics on growth 
emphasize their short-run destabilizing effects on macroeconomic variables and the 
adverse effects that output volatility has on long-term growth. For example, the 
uncertainty and fear generated by an epidemic could reduce consumer confidence and 
could encourage people to stay at home rather than going out, to reduce the 
probability of infection. These effects could cause a significant reduction in private 
consumption spending. In addition, service exports, in particular tourism-related 
exports, could suffer a large decline (as happened in Mexico during the summer of 
2009) while investment could be negatively affected by reduced overall demand and 
heightened uncertainties.  
On the other hand, epidemics could generate opportunities to implement 
needed health care reforms, such as investment in infrastructure and health care 
resources, and therefore have the potential of improving long run growth 
performance. Imagine a poor country that lives with an endemic illness that reduces 
the incentives to invest in human capital because of the probability of being infected. 
Suppose that this country knows it needs to invest in infrastructure to fight this 
illness, but for political reasons, this investment is put off every year. This country 
                                                 





may use –and perhaps needs—exogenous shocks such as epidemics as opportunities 
to learn, reform and improve their health care infrastructure, which may in turn 
enhance economic growth by increasing the incentives to invest in human capital.15 
Furthermore, if the international community sees these epidemics as caused by 
exogenous shocks and not by government actions, they might be willing to use 
Official Development Aid (ODA) and provide the necessary financing for these 
reforms and investment to take place. Overall, this view tends to see epidemics as a 
potentially desirable phenomenon in the process of development.16 
The goal of the paper is to study the empirical association between different 
types of epidemics and economic growth using the Emergency Disasters Database 
(EM-DAT.) This database is maintained by the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and contains data on more than 300 epidemics 
during the period 1961-2005. I subject this database to a battery of econometric tests. 
First, in order to analyze the effect of epidemics on medium to long-run economic 
growth, I use pooled cross-country and time-series data covering 94 countries 
organized in non-overlapping five-year periods, with each country having at most 9 
observations. I estimate the effect of epidemics on the growth rate of per capita GDP 
using ordinary least squares, controlling for unobserved country and regional-specific 
factors, time fixed effects and proxies for investment in human capital, financial 
depth, stability of monetary and fiscal policies, openness to international markets, and 
                                                 
15 In this paper I have two ways of identifying epidemics: (1) either an unusual increase in the number 
of cases of a particular disease, which already exists in the region concerned, or (2) the appearance of a 
new disease in a region where it was previously absent. Note that this example belongs to the first 
definition. 
16 Banerjee (2009) studies which countries receive aid as insurance and why. He shows that Official 
Development Aid is in general pro-cyclical, but when the donor can distinguish downturns caused by 






foreign shocks. Second, in order to addresses endogeneity problems and check the 
robustness of the OLS results, I use a dynamic panel GMM estimation procedure 
developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Specifically, 
these estimators address the econometric problems induced by country-specific 
effects, endogeneity, and the routine use of lagged dependent variables in growth 
regressions. The strategy for addressing possible omitted variable bias created by 
country-specific effects is to difference the regression equation. Next, we instrument 
the right-hand-side variables (the differenced values of the original regressors) using 
lagged values of the original regressors (measured in levels) as instruments. This last 
step removes the inconsistency arising from simultaneity bias, including biases 
induced by the differenced lagged dependent variable. This methodology has been 
used in numerous recent studies of growth [Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000); 
Carkovic and Levine (2005); and Loayza et al (2009)]. 
Next, I complement the medium term growth analysis by presenting a detailed 
short-run analysis of the aftermath of epidemics, tracing the yearly response of GDP 
growth to the onset of these events. This is a necessary step because, as the theoretical 
model shows, it can be the case that an epidemic has no long-run (permanent) 
consequences for economic growth, but generates a significant decline in the short-
run followed by a recovery. Using annual data, I estimate the short-run impact of 
epidemics on economic growth using a panel vector auto-regression model (panel 
VAR). Specifically, I focus on the orthogonalized impulse-response functions, which 





knowledge, this is the first time that this methodology has been used to study the 
short-term impact of epidemics.  
As I said above, the impact of epidemics on economic growth has important 
policy implications. If epidemics have a negative impact on economic growth after 
controlling for endogeneity and other growth determinants, then this strengthens 
arguments for investing resources in disaster prevention and mitigation. Furthermore, 
it would suggest that the gap in income between low and high income countries is not 
only a consequence of “bad policies,” but may also be the result of “bad luck.” If, 
however, we find that epidemics do not exert a negative impact on growth, then this 
would suggest a reconsideration of the rapid expansion of resources invested in 
prevention. While no single paper will resolve these policy issues, this paper 
contributes to these debates. 
My main finding is that different types of epidemics have different effects on 
economic growth. In particular I find that Cholera epidemics increase growth in the 
short and long run, while Influenza epidemics produce a negative effect on short-run 
growth, but no effect in the long-run. Furthermore, I find that the epidemics-growth 
relationship is robust to using instrumental variables to control for endogeneity.  
My results, although new, are to some extent consistent with previous 
empirical findings. Many authors have studied the relationship between epidemics 
and economic growth, without reaching a clear consensus. A problem with most 
previous work is that it has mainly concentrated on the Black Death, the Spanish flu 
and the AIDS/HIV epidemic, which are not the right benchmark to analyze the 





Cholera epidemic. The Black Death and the Spanish flu are not comparable to recent 
epidemics with regards to the size of the shock or data availability. The Black Death 
killed between 30% and 50% of the European population, while the Spanish flu killed 
at least 40 million people worldwide in a few months. These death tolls exceed those 
caused by most wars and natural disasters. These events are too large to be 
representative of epidemics that are likely to occur in the future. Even if we agree that 
the Spanish flu was important in the early 1900s, this may not be an accurate guide to 
the potential impact of a similar epidemic today. Most governments are now better 
prepared for pandemics than they were a hundred years ago. Stocks of anti-viral drugs 
are much greater and distribution systems are better established. A second problem 
with the Black Death and Spanish flu is the lack of sufficient statistical evidence to 
draw clear conclusions. Although data on per capita GDP and epidemics is available 
since the 1900s (and sometimes earlier), data for the necessary controls are only 
available since 1960s. Finally, we would like to know if epidemics still matter. To 
estimate the likely impact of a contemporary epidemic, we need to use more recent 
data, which is what I do in this paper.  
The case of AIDS is also problematic, and should not be used as a benchmark 
for our analysis. AIDS represents a very different type of shock to the economy. An 
epidemic like the Swine flu can affect many victims in a matter of days, whereas 
AIDS evolves slowly and is associated with long periods of reduced productivity and 
expensive medication. In this respect, AIDS is more likely to have long run harmful 
effects on growth. Other differences between HIV and the epidemics considered in 





mostly young people and has long term demographic effects through decreased 
fertility and healthy life expectancy. The epidemics I consider in the present work are 
far more contagious than the HIV virus, and the onset of the epidemic is sudden and 
unexpected. 
On the theoretical side, standard economic theory also offers ambiguous 
predictions regarding the relationship between epidemics and economic growth. 
Assuming that epidemics represent a large negative shock to the population, the effect 
of such a shock on economic growth depends on the model we are considering. In the 
standard Solow model for example, it is clear that a once and for all negative shock to 
the stock of labor increases the capital per worker above its steady state level. In order 
to move back to the steady-state, the economy will lower investment during the 
following years, reducing the growth rate of GDP per capita. Meanwhile, models that 
explain growth by emphasizing the production of new ideas, innovation or human 
capital (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990 and Grossman and Helpman, 1991) suggest 
that epidemics would have a negative impact on growth by reducing the population 
size. Nevertheless, there are also models that predict that epidemics could potentially 
increase the growth rate of per capita GDP. Below I present a simple one-sector 
endogenous growth model, in which a negative shock to the size of the population or 
labor force could lead, on impact, to either an increase or decrease of per capita GDP, 
depending on whether it affects high skilled workers more or less than low skilled 
workers, and to a higher growth rate of per capita GDP in the years after the shock as 
a result of a faster accumulation of human capital. Later I show that this model 





The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing Literature. 
Section 3 presents a standard endogenous growth model and demonstrates that 
epidemics have an ambiguous effect. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology, 
presents the results and discusses their consistency with the theoretical growth model. 




The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of epidemics on 
subsequent economic growth. There are various studies similar in spirit to my work, 
but different in the methodology and database used. In this section I review some of 
these works and reveal that they offer conflicting evidence on the relationship 
between population health shocks and growth. In this literature, three events have 
received most of the attention: the Black Death, the Spanish Flu, and AIDS. Although 
these events are not included in the present study, it’s worth reviewing what previous 
works have found regarding their impact on economic growth.  
The Black Death was one of the deadliest pandemics in human history, 
peaking in Europe between 1348 and 1350. It is believed to have been a combination 
of bubonic and pneumonic plagues that killed between 30% and 50% of the European 
population. Regarding its economic implications, the common view is that this strong 
decrease in the size of the working population led to a rapid increase in real wages. 
However, Hirshleifer (1987) argues that the impact on per capita income is less clear. 





plague on wages, and conclude that the evidence fails to support the hypothesis that 
the Black Death resulted in higher wages for the laboring classes. Perhaps as a result 
of data availability, the effect of the Black Death on wages and per capita income 
remains an unresolved issue. 
The Spanish flu (1918-19) was an influenza pandemic that spread to nearly 
every part of the world. It was caused by an unusually virulent and deadly virus strain 
of subtype H1N1,  the same subtype of the current Swine flu epidemic. As with the 
Black Death pandemic, there is no clear consensus regarding the effects of the 
Spanish Flu upon economic growth. There are some studies that find a negative 
relationship between this epidemic and economic growth. As mentioned earlier, Barro 
and Ursua (2008) claim that the Spanish flu was the fourth worst macroeconomic 
event since 1870. But there are also studies that find the Spanish Flu had a positive 
impact on economic growth. For example, Brainerd and Siegler (2002), using data on 
U.S. states for the 1919–1930 period and controlling for numerous factors including 
initial income, density, human capital, climate, sectoral composition of output, 
geography, and the legacy of slavery, find a large and robust positive effect of the 
influenza epidemic on per capita income growth across states during the 1920s. 
Consistent with these contradicting results, Bloom and Mahal (1997) are unable to 
find a significant relationship. 
Hence, the empirical evidence on the impact of major historical epidemics is 
inconclusive, partly due to the lack of sufficient statistical evidence to draw clear 
conclusions. Although data on per capita GDP and epidemics is available since the 





1960s. While more recent data on epidemics around the world are far from perfect, a 
cross-country study of these episodes appears to provide a unique opportunity to 
analyze the effects of epidemics on economic growth. This is the approach I take in 
the present paper. 
Among recent epidemics, the most prominent in the economics literature is 
HIV/AIDS (i.e. Cuddington, 1993; Cuddington and Hancock, 1994; Bloom and 
Mahal, 1997). Once again, analysts disagree on the effect of AIDS on economic 
growth. Cuddington (1993) and Cuddington and Hancock (1994), simulating the 
effect of AIDS on growth in African countries, suggest that AIDS would reduce GDP 
by 15-25 percent and per capita income by 0-10 percent relative to a no-AIDS 
scenario over a 15 year period. On the other hand, Bloom and Mahal (1997), using 
two-stage least squares to address endogeneity problems  and a database of 51 
countries for the period 1980 through 1992, study the empirical correlation between 
AIDS incidence and per capita GDP growth, and find a statistically insignificant 
coefficient on the AIDS variable.  
In spite of being a very interesting phenomenon worth studying, AIDS is not 
included in the present paper. Although the magnitude of the population shock 
generated by AIDS may ultimately be at least as severe as that of other epidemics, 
such as influenzas, the AIDS epidemic differs in important ways that likely have 
significant implications for its effect on economic growth. First, in contrast to the 
epidemic considered in this paper, which claimed victims within a matter of days of 
infection, AIDS is a slowly evolving disease associated with long periods of reduced 





members for infected individuals. Because of these differences, I have excluded 
AIDS from my sample.  
Motivated by concerns similar to this paper, a group of studies (many 
sponsored by international organizations or governmental agencies) have estimated 
the potential impact of epidemics. Most of them calibrate a model of a national or 
even the global economy, and provide a forecast under different assumptions about 
the gravity of the epidemic: severe (such as the Spanish Flu) or moderate (such as the 
1968 Flu). For example, studying the potential effects of the current Swine flu, BNP 
Paribas estimates that in a severe scenario, GDP would be 4.25% lower after one year 
compared to what would have been observed in the absence of a pandemic, while in a 
mild scenario, the decline in activity could amount to about 1%.17 McKibbin and 
Sidorenko (2006) estimate a global GDP impact of –0.8 per cent from a mild 1968-
type pandemic and –12.6 per cent from a pandemic with population mortality roughly 
double that experienced in 1918. They estimate that the mortality effects of such a 
severe pandemic would be significantly greater in less developed countries, with GDP 
impacts reaching as high as 50 per cent. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO, 2005) estimates that a pandemic with population mortality double that of 1918 
would reduce U.S. GDP by 5 per cent, while a 1957-type pandemic would reduce 
GDP by 1.5 per cent. The IMF Working Group (2006) argues that a severe pandemic 
could have a sharp but short-lasting impact on the economy. Bloom et al. (2005) of 
the Asian Development Bank estimate that a relatively mild pandemic could reduce 
Asian GDP by between 2.6 and 6.8 per cent, depending on the size of assumed 
                                                 
17 BNP Paribas, “The Swine Flu Pandemic: what is the threat to recovery?” Economic Research 





psychological consumption effects. Kennedy et al. (2006) of the Australian Treasury 
estimate that a pandemic half as severe as that of 1918 would reduce Australian GDP 
by 9.3 per cent. Finally, New Zealand’s Treasury (2005) estimates that a severe 
pandemic could reduce GDP by 10 to 20 per cent in the year of impact and by 15 to 
30 per cent over the medium term. These papers are very different from what I do 
here, in that they do not estimate the impact of previous epidemics on the growth rate 
of GDP, but rather quantify the potential impact of an epidemic assuming a particular 
model.  
The paper that is closest to the present one is Raddatz (2009). Raddatz uses 
the same database I use to analyze the growth effects of different types of exogenous 
shocks, including epidemics. However, Raddatz aggregates epidemics with other 
types of human disasters and therefore is unable to provide an answer to my specific 
question. A second similarity with the present work is the use of panel-VAR on 
country-level variables. His attention, however, is limited to low income countries, 
whereas I look at countries at all levels of development.  
The present paper differs from previous works in the following respects. First, 
it looks at the growth response of epidemics at various horizons, ranging from the 
initial impact to long-term, permanent effects. I do this by using both, annual data (to 
look at short-run dynamics) and five year averages (to look at the long-run 
consequences). Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to look 
separately at the effects of different types of epidemics. As it turns out, 








To analyze how different types of epidemics can affect economic growth, we 
have to distinguish between two different issues. First, we need to look at how the 
epidemic affects the composition of the population on impact. This is very important 
and, therefore, I dedicate the next subsection to analyze this issue. The model 
presented in the next subsection suggests that the implications for growth will be 
different if the epidemic affects relatively more skilled workers than if it affects 
relatively more un-skilled workers. Epidemics such as cholera and malaria, which 
tend to affect relatively more un-skilled workers- and therefore increase average 
productivity, could potentially increase the growth rate of per capita GDP, whereas 
epidemics such as influenzas, which do not discriminate by skill level, are less likely 
to have a positive effect.  
Second, epidemics are health crisis and, as in most crisis, their consequences 
will depend on how governments and the international community react to them. A 
health crisis could be an opportunity to induce policy changes and institutional 
innovations that can ultimately be beneficial for subsequent economic growth. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, it is widely believed that the international community 
responds to events such as epidemics by increasing assistance (external aid), 
providing support for development and investment in infrastructure. In other words, it 
is essential to pay attention to how health crisis are managed. Since different types of 
epidemics require different responses, their implications for growth may as well be 






For instance, Hays (2005) argues that human responses to cholera epidemics 
were effective at preventing future outbreaks. Prevention of cholera outbreaks entails 
mitigating factors such as overcrowding, inadequate housing, inadequate excreta 
disposal systems, lack of potable water, floods, unhygienic human behavioral 
practices, etc. In other words, it implies doing large investments in infrastructure to 
assure sustainable access to improved sanitation and water sources and observance of 
hygienic human behavioral practices. Not surprisingly many developed and 
developing nations that have done the investment have been successful at eradicating 
cholera epidemics. Besides the positive effects that stopping cholera may have for 
economic growth by improving human capital, the investment in public infrastructure 
could, per se, have a significant and positive impact on economic growth both in the 
short and long-run.  
Unfortunately, this “virtuous cycle” is not present in the case of malaria 
epidemics. Although malaria epidemics are similar to cholera in terms of the 
composition of the population affected (i.e. low income, low skilled workers), 
attempts to eradicate it, a goal set by the World Health Organization, has had a 
perverse effect. Michael Alkan (2001) reports that insecticides were used in endemic 
areas to break the chain of transmission, but the mosquitoes developed resistance to 
these insecticides. As a result, malaria remains a very common affliction, making the 
treatment and prevention increasingly difficult. As if that were not enough, the 
introduction of insecticides into the ecosystem has proved to be hazardous for 






The difference between cholera and influenza epidemics is also significant in 
this regard. As the facts presented above illustrate, to prevent cholera epidemics 
investment in public health infrastructures is much more important than the 
biomedical response (no vaccine that has been effective at controlling cholera 
outbreaks). The opposite is the case for influenza epidemics. Brainerd and Siegler 
(2002) argue that differences in public health services cannot explain variation in 
mortality rates from influenza epidemics across countries and states in the US, and 
that most public health measures are completely ineffective at stopping the disease. 
On the contrary, it has been shown (see Alkan 2001) that when most of the population 
carries protective antibodies, the epidemic subsides. This immunization is achieved 
by developing and distributing vaccinations. As opposed to the case of cholera 
epidemics, in spite of the positive effect that may have for the society, stopping an 
influenza epidemic is less likely to increase growth in the short run because no large 
investment in infrastructure is involved.   
 
A simple model of Economic Growth and Epidemics 
In order to have a better understanding of the theoretical implications of 
epidemics for economic growth, in this section I present a canonical model of 
endogenous growth based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 5) and Gomez 
(2003). The main purpose of this section is to show that economic theory offers 
ambiguous predictions regarding the relationship between negative population shocks 





skip many details, which the interested reader can find in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) or Gomez (2003).  
One-sector Endogenous Growth Model with Physical and Human Capital 
In this economy there is a benevolent social planner that allocates resources in 
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cu  is a CRRA function, where θ represents the inverse of the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution. The economy produces a single final good, Y, 
using a Cobb-Douglas production function that exhibits constant returns to scale to 
physical and human capital: 
αα −= 1)( ttttt NhKAY , 
where 0<α<1, K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, N is the number of 
workers (which equals the size of the population,) and h is the average level of human 
capital of the workers. For instance, we could think of h as the total number of skilled 
workers (engineers, doctors, etc) divided by the total number of workers (h=H/N). To 
simplify the algebra, I assume that the level of technology A is constant.  
Since the purpose of this paper is to study the impact of epidemics on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita, in order to have theoretical predictions it is necessary 
to write the problem in per capita terms. Using lower case letters to denote a variable 







ttt hAky .   (3.2) 
The model assumes that output can be used for consumption or investment in 
physical or human capital. For simplicity once again, I assume that physical and 
human capital depreciate at the same rate, δ. The depreciation of human capital 
includes losses from skill deterioration and mortality of skilled workers.  
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The social planner’s problem is to maximize (3.1) subject to the constraints 
(3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) and the non-negativity constraints 0;0 ≥≥ Ht
K
t ii . The current 
value Hamiltonian is: 



























where λ, µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers for (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) respectively. The 
first order conditions (FOC) of the problem are: 
λθ =−tc ,     





















The First order conditions imply that, at an interior solution, the net returns on 
physical and human capital must be equal 
αααα αα −−− −= tttt hAkhAk )1(
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I assume that the parameters are so that γ>0. It is readily shown that c, k, h and 
y must all grow at the same constant rate γ. 
 
Effect of an epidemic shock 
I now analyze the effect of an epidemic on the growth rate of output per 
capita. I look first at the path of growth right after the epidemic, and then explain 
what happens to output per capita at the moment of the shock.  
Potentially, there is more than one way in that an epidemic could affect the 
economy.18 Here I assume that an epidemic will destroy (kill) workers, among which 
there will be some skilled workers and some unskilled workers, and have no effect on 









 so that k 
will be abundant relative to h, and its marginal productivity will thus be lower than 
                                                 





the marginal productivity of human capital. If there were no non-negativity 
constraints, the adjustment would entail immediately increasing h and decreasing k by 
discrete amounts so that the ratio of physical to human capital would remain at its 







, with all variables growing at the same constant rate γ 
thereafter. However, this solution requires negative gross investment in physical 
capital at an infinite rate, and we have assumed that investment must be non-negative. 
The desire to reduce k implies that the inequality 0≥Kti  will be binding during the 
transition to the steady state, whereas ih>0. As the economy evolves the ratio of 
physical to human capital will decrease until the returns on both factors are equalized.  
It can be shown that during the transition GDP per capita grows at a higher 
rate than along the balanced growth path.19 The growth rate immediately following 
the initial impact of the shock will satisfy: 




















































and         δχωαγ α −−−= ATransitiony )1( , 
where ω=k/h and  χ=c/h.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)20 show that during the transition ω decreases 
monotonically to its balanced path value ω*=(α/1-α), and χ increases monotonically, 
which means that γy is decreasing monotonically. Since γy falls monotonically toward 
γ*>0, it must be positive, but declining during the transition. This result implies that 
                                                 
19 See Gomez (2003) for a detail exposition of the dynamics during the transition 





the growth rate of output, γy, is positively related with the ratio ω=k/h. Thus, there is 
an imbalance effect: the greater the epidemic shock, the higher the growth rate. 
In summary, in the short and medium-run, the economy responds to the 
epidemic with a massive accumulation of human capital in order to catch up with 
physical capital. This accumulation of human capital generates an increase in the 
growth rate of per capita GDP. Gomez (2003) shows that this regime prevails until 
the returns to both types of capital are equalized, and that this happens in a finite 
period of time. In summary, if this model is right, we should see an increase in the 
growth rate of per capita GDP in the aftermath of epidemics. However, we still need 
to see what happens to per capita GDP at the moment of the shock.  
The next step is to determine what happens to output per capita (y) at the 
moment of the epidemic. I argue that the effect will depend on the type of epidemic. 
As I show in Figure 1, epidemics that affect skilled workers more than unskilled 
workers could potentially reduce per capita GDP on impact, while epidemics that 
mainly affect unskilled workers, will generate a jump (increase) in per capita GDP. 
To understand the intuition for these results, we should first remember that 
k=K/N and h=H/N, where K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, H is the 
aggregate stock of skilled workers and N is the total number of workers (or the size of 
the population). We would expect the epidemic to reduce the total stock of labor (N) 
and the aggregate stock of human capital (H), but have no impact on physical capital. 
So there are two issues to consider here. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the 
stock of capital per worker (k) would increase, but on the other hand, the effect of a 





relative responses of: the total stock of labor (N) and the aggregate stock of human 
capital (H). There is some evidence that epidemics typically affect unskilled workers 
more than they affect skilled workers (see Brainerd and Siegler, 2003). In other 
words, the typical epidemic increases average human capital per worker (h).  This 
means that output per worker jumps up at the moment the epidemic occurs.   
But, there is also evidence that some particular types of epidemics affect 
skilled workers more than unskilled workers (see Crosby, 2003). In particular, 
Influenza epidemics affect skilled workers more so than other types of epidemics. If 
this is the case, at the moment of the shock we would see a decrease in average 
human capital (h). If the decrease in h is strong enough to outweigh the increase in 
physical capital per worker, we would see a decrease in per capita GDP upon impact, 
which would cause a decrease in the growth rate for that year (see Figure 1). 
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In summary, the implications of the one sector model are, to some extent, 
surprising. The model suggests that epidemics have the potential to enhance 
development. As we can see in Figure 1, for epidemics that affect unskilled workers 
more than skilled workers, the model predicts an instantaneous increase in output and 
consumption per worker followed by higher growth during the transition to the steady 
state. For the case of epidemics that affect skilled workers more than unskilled 
workers, the model predicts an initial decrease in GDP per capita and its growth rate, 
followed by a fast recovery. Hence, I argue that the effect of epidemics on economic 
growth is an empirical question. The empirical analysis is what we do next. 
The theoretical predictions discussed above have important implications for 
my empirical study. First, for the medium and long-run analysis that uses five year 
averages, we should expect a positive relationship between epidemics affecting 
primarily unskilled workers (shown in panel b of Figure 1 as Type A) and the growth 
rate of per capita GDP. However, for epidemics that primarily affect skilled workers 
(Shown in panel a), the prediction is not as clear, and thus the relationship is less 
likely to be significant. Second, for the short-run analysis, using annual data we 
should expect that epidemics of type B reduce growth in the short-run, while 
epidemics of type A should increase growth.   
 
Data, Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
This paper studies the growth effects of epidemics in the short-run and on 





tractable, I present the methodologies and results in separate sub-sections. But first, 
section 4.1 presents a brief description of the EM-DAT database and some facts about 
the types of epidemics considered. Next, I present the methodology and results of the 
medium to long run analysis and the short run analysis.  
 
Database and facts about epidemics  
In this sub-section I provide a brief description of the EM-DAT database and 
present some facts about the types of epidemics considered.  
EM-DAT is a worldwide database on disasters maintained by CRED with the 
sponsorship of the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). It contains data on the occurrence and effects of 
more than 17,000 natural disasters and epidemics in the world from 1900 to the 
present. The database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-
governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press 
agencies. 
CRED defines an epidemic as “either an unusual increase in the number of 
cases of a disease, which already exists in the region or population concerned, or the 
appearance of an infection previously absent from a region.” EM-DAT only 
considers situations or events which overwhelm local capacity, necessitating a request 
at the national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often 
sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering. For an event 





10 or more people reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; declaration 
of a state of emergency; or a call for international assistance.  
CRED divides epidemics according to type (for example: cholera, malaria, 
influenza, etc), and provides the dates when the epidemic occurred and ended; the 
number of casualties (people confirmed dead) and the number of people affected 
(requiring immediate medical treatment as a direct result of the epidemic). Next, I 
present some facts about each type of epidemic considered in the study. 
 
Arbovirus 
Arbovirus is a shortened name given to viruses that are transmitted by 
arthropods, or arthropod-borne viruses, which include Yellow fever, Dengue, Ebola, 
Japanese encephalitis, Haemorrhagic fever and some other diseases. In my sample 
there are 89 epidemics belonging to this category. They affect on average 10,000 
people and have a mortality rate of 1.13%. Most of these epidemics (95%) have taken 
place in middle and low income countries, while only 4% of them have affected high 
income countries. With respect to geographic areas, almost 70% of them took place 
either in Latin America or South Asia, while around 30% of them occurred in Sub-




Cholera is an infectious gastroenteritis caused by enterotoxin-producing 





prevention of the disease is normally straightforward if proper sanitation practices are 
followed. In high income countries, due to nearly universal advanced water treatment 
and sanitation practices, cholera is no longer a major health threat. As shown in 
Figure 1, only 0.7% of the cholera epidemics in my sample took place in advanced 
nations. But Cholera still heavily affects populations in developing countries (99% of 
the cases in my sample) due to deficiencies in filtering and chlorination of water 
supplies. Among the developing world, more than 50% of the epidemics in the 
sample took place in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 2). The other regions with most 
outbreaks were South Asia (19.4%) and Latin America (17%). The outbreak in South 
America during the first years of the 1990’s began in Peru and eventually led to 1.04 
million identified cases and almost 10,000 deaths.  
Cholera exists as a seasonal disease in many endemic countries, occurring 
annually mostly during rainy seasons, however, these cases are not included in my 
sample. Cholera epidemics are included in the sample only if there is either an 
unusual increase in the number of cases of the disease, which already exists in the 
region concerned, or when it appears in a region where it was previously absent. For 
example, the most recent epidemic is the 2008 Zimbabwean cholera outbreak, which 
is still continuing. In this epidemic, an estimated 96,591 people in the country have 










Malaria is one of the most common infectious diseases and an enormous 
public health problem. Malaria is an endemic problem in many countries generating 
approximately 350–500 million cases annually, killing between one and three million 
people, the majority of whom are young children in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, as 
in the case of cholera, my sample includes a malaria epidemic only when there is an 
unusual increase in the number of cases of the disease, which already exists in the 
region concerned, or if it appears in a region where it was previously absent. Only 39 
events satisfy this definition. More than 40% of malaria-epidemics took place in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 31.6% in South Asia and the other 25% distributed between East 
Asia & Pacific and Latin America (see Figure2). The main reason for including 
Malaria as a separate epidemic in our study is that is commonly associated with 
poverty, but is also a cause of poverty and it is considered to be a major impediment 
to economic development. 
 
Influenza  
Influenza, commonly referred to as the flu, are infectious diseases caused by 
RNA viruses of the family Orthomyxoviridae (the influenza viruses), which affect 
birds and mammals. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), evolutions 
in influenza viruses cannot be predicted. This makes it difficult to know if or when a 
virus might become easily transmittable among humans. The WHO indicates that 
accurate predictions of mortality cannot be made before a pandemic virus emerges 





Every winter, tens of millions of people get the flu and a few hundred 
thousand people die every year. But once again, as for cholera and malaria, influenza 
epidemics are included in the sample only if there is either an unusual increase in the 
number of cases of the disease which already exists in the region concerned, or when 
it appears in a region where it was previously absent.  
Influenzas are really a global phenomenon. There is a clear difference 
between influenzas and other types of epidemics in how they are distributed around 
the world. As we can see from Figure 2, influenzas affect high income countries as 
much (or perhaps more) as they affect low and middle income countries. In the 
sample of epidemics used in this study, almost 37% of the influenzas considered have 
affected high income countries, whereas less than 30% of them have affected low 
income countries.  
In a typical influenza epidemic the majority of the victims are young children 
and the elderly, giving the age profile of mortality a distinct ‘U’ shape. However, this 
is not the case in all epidemics. A distinguishing characteristic of the 1918 epidemic 
was that it disproportionately killed men and women age 15 to 44, so that the age 
profile of mortality instead followed a ‘W’ pattern. Also, some observers (e.g. 
Crosby, 1989 and Rice, 1988) argue that the socioeconomic status of influenza 
victims indicates few differences in mortality rates across income groups, and that 
people from high income groups have a higher probability of being infected and 
spread the disease to different countries when they travel for business or tourism. 
Since people at higher levels of income are generally associated with high skill levels, 





workers more than unskilled workers. As I showed in the previous section, this could 
cause the impact of influenzas on economic growth to differ from other epidemics. 
 
The current Swine Flu Epidemic 
In April 2009 a novel flu strain evolved that combined genes from human, 
pig, and bird flu. This strain, initially dubbed "swine flu" and also known as influenza 
A/H1N1, emerged in Mexico, the United States, and several other nations. The World 
Health Organization officially declared the outbreak to be a "pandemic" on June 11, 
2009. The WHO's declaration of a pandemic level 6 was an indication of spread, not 
severity. According to the World Health Organization, it took the A/H1N1 virus less 
than six weeks to spread widely, while previous flu pandemics in 1918, 1957 and 
1968 needed more than six months to spread to the same extent. As a result of 
spreading concern about this outbreak, President Barak Obama declared a sate of 
National Emergengy on October 24th of 2009. Concerns have been voiced regarding 
the potential macroeconomic consequences (i.e. BNP Paribas (September, 2009)  and 












Figure 2: Distribution of different types of epidemics by: 












Arbovirus Cholera Malaria Influenza







































































































Arbovirus Cholera Malaria Influenza
Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia North America MiddleEast & North Africa
Latin America & Carebean East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia  
Source: Author’s own calculations using data from EM-DAT. The division by level of 
development and region of the world comes from World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Estimating the medium to long-run impact of epidemics 
This section studies the effect of epidemics on the medium to long-run 
economic growth rate of the aggregate economy. I use pooled cross-country and time-
series data covering 94 countries over the period 1961-2005. The data is organized in 
non-overlapping five-year periods, with each country having at most 9 observations.  
In order to check the robustness of the results using OLS, I build on the panel-data 
growth regression literature and use a GMM procedure to address endogeneity and to 
control for unobserved country-specific factors, as presented for example in Loayza, 
Olaberria, Rigolini and Christensen (2009). Further details on the system GMM 







Data and Regression Specification  
The point of departure is a growth regression equation designed for estimation 
using (cross-country, time-series) panel data: 
 ,,2,11,01,, tijittititititi EPCVyyy εθηµβββ ++++++=− −−   (4.2.1) 
Where the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively; y 
is the log of output per capita, CV is a set of control variables, and EP represents the 
incidence of epidemics; µt, ηi and θj denote unobserved time-, country- and regional-
specific effects, respectively; and ε is the error term.  The regression equation is 
dynamic in the sense that it includes the level of output per capita at the start of the 
corresponding period in the set of explanatory variables. 
The dependent variable is the average annual rate of real output growth (i.e., 
the log difference of output per capita normalized by the length of the period). Data 
for output was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI 
2007).   
I divide the set of growth determinants in three groups. The first group is 
composed of variables that measure transitional convergence, structural policies, 
institutions and stabilization policies. The second set of variables proxies the role of 
external conditions that may affect the growth performance across countries. Finally, 
I pay special attention to epidemics, which represent the subject matter of the paper. 
To control for transitional convergence, we use the initial value of output per 





initial position of the economy is important for its subsequent growth, all things 
equal.  
With respect to structural policies and institutions, I consider measures of 
education and human capital, financial development, monetary and fiscal policy and 
trade openness. Education is proxied by the gross rate of enrollment in secondary 
school, which is the ratio of the number of students enrolled in primary school to the 
number of persons of the corresponding age. Financial depth is measured as the ratio 
of domestic credit to GDP.  Our first proxy of macroeconomic stabilization is the 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate, with high inflation being associated with 
bad macroeconomic policies. In addition, I measure the government burden as the 
ratio of general government consumption to GDP. Finally, I include a measure of 
trade openness, namely the volume of trade (exports and imports) over GDP. For all 
these variables, the source of information is the World Bank (WDI 2007). 
With regard to external variables, the regressions include terms of trade, to 
capture shifts in the demand for a country’s exports and period- and regional-specific 
dummies, which capture the impact of other global and regional trends of growth 
across countries. All these data are from the World Bank (WDI 2007). 
My most important variables proxy the impact of epidemics on growth. As 
explained above, data for epidemics was obtained from the Emergency Disasters 
Database (EM-DAT), maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED). In particular, for each epidemic I measure the size of the disaster 
as the log of the sum of the total number of people affected over the five -year period, 
























indexes the number of events that took place in country i during (five-year) period t.  
By considering the sum of the number of people affected per event, the measure 
explicitly accounts for both the frequency and the intensity of epidemics, contrary to 
many of the measures used in the literature.  To enable comparison across countries, 
further normalization by the total population is undertaken to correct for differences 
in population size. 
Inspection of the distribution of the weighted sum of epidemics shows that it 
is positively skewed. Consequently the log is taken to avoid that the empirical results 
are driven by extreme values.  Observations for which no event has been reported 
over a five year period are assigned a value of to -20, which is just below the lowest 
observation for which an event was reported.21   
Finally, the regression presented above poses some challenges for estimation. 
The first is the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects. While the 
inclusion of period-specific dummy variables can account for the time effects, the 
common methods of dealing with country-specific effects (that is, within-group or 
difference estimators) might be inappropriate given the dynamic nature of the 
regression. The second challenge is that most explanatory variables are likely to be 
jointly endogenous with economic growth, so we need to control for the biases 
resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation.  Although epidemics are assumed 
exogenous their effects would be incorrectly estimated if the endogeneity of the 
remaining variables in the model is ignored.   In the following paragraphs we present 
a brief explanation of the econometric methodology used to control for country-
                                                 






specific effects and joint endogeneity in a dynamic model of panel data (see the 
Appendix for more details on the methodology). 
To control for country-specific effects and joint endogeneity, I use the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of 
panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano 
and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). These estimators are based, first, 
on differencing regressions or instruments to control for unobserved effects and, 
second, on using previous observations of explanatory and lagged-dependent 
variables as instruments. The method deals with unobserved time effects through the 
inclusion of period specific intercepts. Dealing with unobserved country effects is not 
as simple given the possibility that the model is dynamic and contains endogenous 
explanatory variables. Unobserved country effects are controlled for by differencing 
and instrumentation.  
Likewise, the method relies on instrumentation to control for joint 
endogeneity. Specifically, it allows relaxing the assumption of strong exogeneity of 
the explanatory variables by allowing them to be correlated with current and previous 
realizations of the error term. Parameter identification is achieved by assuming that 
future realizations of the error term do not affect current values of the explanatory 
variables, that the error term is serially uncorrelated, and that changes in the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved country-specific effect. 
As Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) show, this set of 
assumptions generates moment conditions that allow estimation of the parameters of 





lagged values of both levels and differences of the explanatory and dependent 
variables (the latter if the model is dynamic). 
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of 
the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this 
issue by considering two specification tests.  The first is the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which tests the validity of the instruments by analyzing 
the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process.  Failure 
to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.  The second test examines 
whether the original error term is serially correlated.  The model is, therefore, 
supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected.  In the system specification, I test 
in fact whether the first-differenced error term (that is, the residual of the equation in 
differences) is second-order serially correlated.  First-order serial correlation of the 
differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is 
uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  Second-order serial correlation 
of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially correlated 
and follows a moving average process of at least order one. 
 
Results 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 1-3.  In all Tables, the 
dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita.  For ease of exposition, the 
four tables follow a symmetric pattern.  The first column considers all epidemics 
aggregated into a single index. The next four columns report results from 





epidemics. The set of explanatory variables always includes the same control 
variables. 
To establish the validity of my results in the context of the growth literature, I 
start by analyzing the results corresponding to the standard growth determinants. 
Table 1 presents OLS results. In brief, the coefficients on controls are consistent with 
the previous empirical literature.  Initial GDP per capita carries a significantly 
negative coefficient, commonly interpreted as evidence of conditional convergence.  
The proxies of education, financial depth, and trade openness have positive and 
significant coefficients, denoting their beneficial impact on economic growth.  
Government consumption and price inflation, on the other hand, carry negative 
coefficients, indicating the harmful consequences of a large fiscal burden and 
macroeconomic price instability. External shocks are also important growth 
determinants.  More favorable terms of trade positively affect economic growth.  The 
period dummies (not shown in the tables to save space) indicate that international 
economic growth experienced a declining trend over 1960-2000, resulting in less 
favorable external conditions in the 1980s and 1990s than in previous decades. 
Finally, for the case of the system GMM methodology I need to look at the 
specification tests. The Hansen and serial-correlation tests indicate that the null 
hypothesis of correct specification cannot be rejected, lending support to our 
estimation results.  This is also the case for the remaining exercise presented below, 
and I only mention it here in order to avoid redundancy. 
Next, I turn to the growth effects of epidemics. I simply describe the results in 





the short-run analysis are presented. The combined index of epidemics carries a 
negative but not statistically significant coefficient.  The lack of a significant effect 
reflects well the theoretical ambiguity of standard growth models. The remaining 
columns disaggregate the epidemics index to disentangle this ambiguity. Individual 
epidemics have contrasting effects on growth: while Arbovirus and Influenza 
epidemics appear to produce lower growth (although not significantly), Cholera 
epidemics seem to lead to significantly higher growth.   Malaria epidemics also 
appear to have a positive growth effect, but the effect is statistically insignificant.  
These results hold for both samples (All Countries and Developing Countries), and 
for both methodologies (OLS and System GMM). Hence, it appears that the positive 
effect of cholera epidemics on long-run economic growth is robust. 
 
Are the effects of epidemics on economic growth quantitatively important? 
Here, as in Chapter 2, I ask whether the effect of epidemics is important 
quantitatively. The answer to this question is illustrated in Chart 1, which presents the 
estimates of the growth effect of a typical epidemic.  The calculations are made using 
the point estimates of the coefficients, presented in Table 1 and 2 
.Chart 1 
Quantitative effect of epidemic on the Growth Rate of GDP pc
Epidemic
Arbovirus -0.15 -0.25









I concentrate on the effects of cholera epidemics, because cholera is the only 
significant epidemic in the regressions. A typical cholera epidemic produces an 
increase of annual growth rate of GDP per capita of between 0.7 and 0.83 percentage 
points depending on the methodology considered. Hence, I conclude that the 
quantitative effect of cholera is of a very significant magnitude. 
 
Estimating the short-run impact of epidemics  
To study the effect of epidemics on economic growth in the short run, I use 
pooled cross-country and annual time-series data covering 94 countries over the 
period 1961-2005. The panel is unbalanced, with some countries having more 
observations than others.  
The variables used in this section are a sub-set of the ones used in the medium 
and long-run analysis. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To capture external conditions that may affect short-
run growth, I control for the growth rate of the country’s Terms of Trade (TOT), to 
capture shifts in the demand for a country’s exports. As before, data for these 
variables were obtained from the World Bank (WDI, 2007). The last set of variables 
measures the impact of epidemics on growth. Throughout the exercise, I assume that 










I study the short-run effect of epidemics using the panel data Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methodology. This technique combines the traditional VAR 
approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with panel-data 
techniques alowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity.22 Here I present a brief 
decription and the main intuition of the methodology.  
I specify a first-order three-variable VAR model as follows: 
 
 
where zt=[z1t  z2t  z3t]; and where  z1t is  the number of  epidemics, z2t 
represents  terms of trade shocks and z3t is the growth rate of GDP per capita, which 
is my main variable of interest.  
I focus the analysis on the impulse-response functions, which describe the 
reaction of one variable in the system to the innovations in another variable in the 
system, holding all other shocks at zero. However, since the actual variance-
covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, to isolate shocks to one 
variabvle it is necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become 
orthogonal. The usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering and allocate any 
correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes first 
in the ordering. The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in 
the ordering affect the later variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion of the standard panel VAR model and the computation of impulse-response 













the variables that come later only affect the earlier variables with a lag. Following this 
convention, I assume that: 
• Epidemics shocks have contemporaneous effects on GDP growth rates and 
terms of trade shocks; 
• Terms of trade shocks have contemporaneous effects on GDP growth rates; 
but not on epidemics;  
• GDP growth shocks do not have any contemporaneous effect on the other two 
variables 
 In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, I need to impose the restriction 
that the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this 
constraint is likely to be violated in practice, one way to relax the restriction on 
parameters is to introduce fixed effects. Since the fixed effects are correlated with the 
regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the mean differencing procedure 
commonly used to eliminate fixed effects will create biased coefficients. To avoid 
this problem I use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the Helmert 
procedure (see Arellano and Bover 1995). This procedure removes only the forward 
mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year. 
Since this transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables 
and lagged regressors, we use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the 
coefficients by system GMM (see Appendix for more details). 
To analyze the impulse-response functions I need some estimate of their 
confidence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed 





account. Hence, I use Monte Carlo simulation to generate their confidence intervals 
of the impulse response functions.  
 
Results 
I now report and discuss the main results on the growth consequences of 
natural disasters. I organize the presentation by type of epidemic –arbovirus, cholera, 
malaria, and influenzas. For each type of epidemic, I present impulse responses for its 
effect on real per capita GDP growth. I first estimate these effects using the sample of 
all countries. Then, I estimate these effects using the sample of developing countries 
only. Impulse responses are presented in Figures 3 to 6, along with 90% confidence 
intervals.  
Figure 3 shows impulse-responses function of GDP growth to an Arbovirus 
shock both for the sample of All Countries and for Developing Countries only. 
Contrary to the insignificant results from the long-run analysis, Arbovirus now has a 
significant negative effect on GDP growth. This effect is strongest in the year 
following the shock, and it is slightly larger in developing countries.  
Next, Figure 4 shows that cholera epidemics tend to have a positive effect on 
economic growth. This confirms the results found in the long-run analysis. The mean 
response of the growth rate of GDP per capita to a cholera shock is positive and 
significant a few years after the event. The timing of the impulse response suggests 
that cholera does not affect per capita GDP on impact, but only with a lag. One 
explanation for these results is that cholera epidemics generate opportunities for 
needed but costly reforms to take place, such as investment in public health 





performance. To understand the logic of this argument, we need to go back to the 
stylized facts presented above. In many poor countries cholera is an endemic disease, 
which might affect long-run incentives to invest in human capital because of the 
probability of being infected. Suppose that this country knows it needs to invest in 
infrastructure to fight this illness, such as advanced water treatment facilities and 
sanitation practices, such as filtering and chlorination of water supplies, but for 
political reasons, this investment is put off every year. This country may use –and 
perhaps needs— an exogenous shock such as a cholera epidemic to force it to 
improve its health care infrastructure. Furthermore, if the international community 
sees these epidemics as caused by exogenous shocks and not by government actions, 
they might be willing to use Official Development Aid (ODA)23 and provide the 
necessary financing for these reforms and investment to take place. These 
developments may in turn enhance economic growth in the short-run as a result of the 
increase in investment, and also generate an increase in long-run growth by 
increasing the incentives to invest in human capital. This might be why we find that 
cholera epidemics increase growth with lag (it takes a few years for the investments 
to begin) in the short-run analysis, and also why we find cholera to increase growth 
permanently in the long-run analysis. 
Next, Figure 5 plots the impulse response of growth to Malaria. These 
epidemics are weaker in terms of statistical significance than in the case of Arbovirus 
and Cholera. Finally, I find that influenza type epidemics have similar dynamic 
                                                 
23 Banerjee (2009) studies which countries receive aid as insurance and why. He shows that Official 
Development Aid is in general pro-cyclical. However, when the donor can distinguish downturns 
caused by exogenous shocks from those caused by government actions, aid policy is countercyclical 
and acts as 





effects as Arbovirus. As we can see in Figure 6, the mean response of the growth rate 
of real per capita GDP to an influenza shock is negative during the second and third 
year of the epidemic, but then becomes insignificant.   
How can we explain these results in light of the theoretical model presented 
above? Remember that our theoretical model predicts that some epidemics, those that 
affect skilled workers relatively more than unskilled workers would generate an 
initial decrease in per capita GDP, followed by quick recovery. Note, that if this is the 
case, we might see a negative effect on short-term GDP growth when looking at the 
impulse-response function, but no effect in the long-run, since the initial negative 
effect would be fully offset by the subsequent recovery. I argue that influenzas belong 
to this group. As I mentioned above, there is some evidence that the flu has a larger 
effect on countries and people at higher levels of income than other types of 
epidemics. In fact, as shown in Figure 6, when high income countries are left out and 
only developing countries are considered, the negative effect of influenzas is smaller 
and shorter-lived. 
On the other hand, our theoretical model predicts that epidemics affecting 
unskilled workers generate higher growth both in the short-run and long-run (I argue 
that cholera epidemics belong to this group). There is no doubt that cholera affects 
primarily low and middle income countries, where the stock of human capital is very 
low, and cholera has stronger effects on unskilled workers. 
Another question that we may ask is why the negative impact of influenzas 
occurs only with a one year or two year lag, rather than at the moment of the shock? 





in time. However, actual epidemics do not occur in a single moment in time, but 
rather take time to spread and develop. A clear example is the current swine flu 
epidemic, which started at the beginning of 2009, but whose effects are expected to 
peak by January or February 2010. In my sample, the impact of the epidemic is taken 
at the moment when the outbreak begins, but many of these events last for more than 
a year. Hence, it is logical to expect that the decrease in GDP per capita could be 
observed in the second or third year of the event, which is what we see in the 
impulse-response functions. 
A priori, Malaria and Arbovirus should also primarily affect the unskilled, but 
empirical evidence suggests that their impact differs from cholera. I don’t have an 
explanation for these results and recognize them as a limitation of the model 
presented in section 3. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there are other 
models that predict a negative effect of epidemics on growth and may be cholera is 
the real puzzle. Also, the political economy explanation for cholera, which is outside 












This paper contributes to the debate on the macroeconomic impact of 
epidemics by conducting a disaggregated analysis by type of epidemic. Specifically, 
the paper assesses the potentially different impacts of arbovirus, cholera, malaria and 
influenza on the short and long-run growth of per capita GDP.  
My findings present strong evidence that the relationship between epidemics 
and growth depends on the type of epidemic. I show that a combined index of 
epidemics has a statistically insignificant association with overall GDP growth, which 
reflects the theoretical ambiguity and the inconsistent empirical evidence on the 
growth impact of epidemics in the received literature. I then attempt to disentangle 
this ambiguity by disaggregating the analysis by type of epidemic. 
I find that the effect of cholera epidemics is strongly positive. Cholera could 
generate opportunities to implement health care reforms, such as investment in public 
health infrastructure which have the potential of improving long run growth 
performance. This country may use a cholera epidemic as an opportunity to obtain the 
political will, and perhaps the international aid, to reform and improve its health care 
infrastructure, which may in turn enhance economic growth in the short-run as a 
result of the increase in investment, and also in the long-run by increasing the 
incentives to invest in human capital.  
By contrast, I find that the impact of arbovirus and influenza on growth is 
negative in the short-run but insignificant in the medium to long-run, which could be 
explained by the recovery generated in the years that follow the shock.  
In light of this evidence, the paper argues that the current Swine Flu epidemic 





However, the effects should be concentrated in the short-run, and we should see a 



































Dependent Variable: Five year average of growth rate of GDP pc
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations) Estimation Method: Least Square
VARIABLES All Arbovirus Cholera Malaria Influenza
All Epidemics 0.007
[0.367]
Epidemic X -0.015 0.073*** 0.025 -0.061
[-0.446] [2.820] [0.569] [-1.045]
Other Epidemics 0.010 -0.025 -0.000 0.014
[0.490] [-1.174] [-0.0111] [0.691]
Controls: 
Initial GDP -0.522*** -0.524*** -0.406** -0.508** -0.510**
[-2.591] [-2.584] [-1.989] [-2.540] [-2.495]
Education 0.648** 0.638** 0.516* 0.651** 0.610**
[2.408] [2.359] [1.901] [2.435] [2.241]
Domestic Credit (% GDP) 0.256 0.260 0.244 0.256 0.246
[1.267] [1.283] [1.214] [1.272] [1.215]
Government Spending (% GDP) -1.842*** -1.871*** -1.887*** -1.830*** -1.906***
[-4.688] [-4.739] [-4.829] [-4.677] [-4.808]
Inflation -3.600*** -3.563*** -3.570*** -3.541*** -3.574***
[-4.507] [-4.425] [-4.503] [-4.426] [-4.473]
Trade Openness 0.810*** 0.831*** 0.862*** 0.784*** 0.878***
[3.139] [3.188] [3.353] [3.070] [3.331]
Growth of Terms of Trade 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.063***
[3.437] [3.435] [3.254] [3.435] [3.363]
Dummy Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy Wars and Natural Disasters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 23.899*** 23.512*** 24.208*** 23.889*** 22.762***
[5.499] [5.244] [5.599] [5.402] [4.992]
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
Number of id 94 94 94 94 94
z-statistics in brackets
















Dependent Variable: Five year average of growth rate of GDP pc
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations) Estimation Method: System GMM
VARIABLES All Arbovirus Cholera Malaria Influenza
All Epidemics 0.004
[0.208]
Epidemic X -0.024 0.061*** 0.003 -0.070
[-0.794] [3.010] [0.0908] [-1.419]
Other Epidemics 0.006 -0.017 0.002 0.007
[0.349] [-0.840] [0.122] [0.367]
Controls: 
Initial GDP 0.070 0.002 0.098 0.048 -0.015
[0.138] [0.00431] [0.183] [0.0939] [-0.0287]
Education 0.809 0.730 1.083 0.739 0.715
[1.175] [1.048] [1.616] [1.071] [1.040]
Domestic Credit (% GDP) 0.118 0.130 0.164 0.098 0.095
[0.585] [0.657] [0.847] [0.494] [0.440]
Government Spending (% GDP) -3.713*** -3.798*** -3.572*** -3.720*** -3.634***
[-7.181] [-7.075] [-7.176] [-6.639] [-7.189]
Inflation -5.818*** -5.611*** -5.263*** -5.894*** -5.474***
[-5.302] [-5.263] [-5.083] [-5.336] [-5.013]
Trade Openness 1.197** 1.352** 1.384*** 1.238** 1.337**
[2.386] [2.595] [2.885] [2.473] [2.554]
Growth of Terms of Trade 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.052***
[3.928] [3.904] [3.708] [3.809] [3.665]
Dummy Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy Wars and Natural Disasters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 31.589*** 30.799*** 27.671*** 32.381*** 29.270***
[4.295] [4.289] [3.830] [4.400] [4.047]
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
Number of id 94 94 94 94 94
Number of Instruments 55 55 55 55 55
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.400 0.374 0.265 0.394 0.374
Hansen 0.344 0.323 0.303 0.341 0.396
t-statistics in brackets













Dependent Variable: Five year average of growth rate of GDP pc
Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations) Estimation Method: System GMM
Epidemics Treated as Endogenous Variable
VARIABLES All Arbovirus Cholera Malaria Influenza
All Epidemics -0.013
[-0.348]
Epidemic X -0.050 0.110** 0.066 -0.294***
[-1.141] [2.543] [1.431] [-3.074]
Other Epidemics 0.004 -0.034 0.003 0.045*
[0.169] [-1.000] [0.145] [1.929]
Controls: 
Initial GDP -0.226 -0.438 0.166 -0.086 -0.148
[-0.510] [-1.102] [0.607] [-0.201] [-0.385]
Education 0.686 0.351 0.871* 0.460 0.855
[1.117] [0.613] [1.678] [0.713] [1.420]
Domestic Credit (% GDP) 0.252 0.287 0.373** 0.095 0.141
[1.287] [1.577] [2.017] [0.490] [0.677]
Government Spending (% GDP) -4.103*** -3.210*** -3.971*** -2.968*** -3.123***
[-8.337] [-7.578] [-8.312] [-5.763] [-6.278]
Inflation -5.709*** -4.697*** -5.671*** -4.892*** -5.130***
[-5.915] [-5.403] [-5.780] [-4.883] [-5.731]
Trade Openness 1.120** 1.331*** 1.452*** 1.287*** 1.146**
[2.317] [2.779] [3.089] [2.677] [2.450]
Growth of Terms of Trade 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.058***
[5.648] [6.370] [4.179] [4.886] [4.591]
Dummy Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy Wars and Natural Disasters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 34.553*** 29.327*** 29.872*** 29.415*** 23.991***
[5.838] [5.217] [5.442] [4.327] [3.786]
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
Number of id 94 94 94 94 94
Number of Instruments 65 65 65 65 65
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.400 0.370 0.180 0.385 0.257
Hansen 0.415 0.161 0.504 0.218 0.733
t-statistics in brackets









Figure 3: Response of Growth to an Arbovirus shock 








Figure 4: Response of Growth to a Cholera shock 








Figure 5: Response of Growth to a Malaria shock 







Figure 6: Response of Growth to an Influenza shock 






Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps







Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth rate GDP pc (%) 544 1.58 2.52 -5.75 9.86
Initial GDP pc (in logs) 544 7.62 1.56 4.44 10.53
Education: Enrollment in Secondary School (in logs) 544 3.63 0.90 0.11 4.97
Financial Depth (in logs) 544 3.42 0.87 0.14 5.40
Government Burden (in logs) 544 2.62 0.37 1.42 3.36
Inflation (Log(100%+Growth Rate CPI)) 544 4.71 0.14 4.57 5.78
Trade Openness (in logs) 544 4.00 0.58 2.21 6.00
Growth rate Terms of Trade (%) 544 -0.37 4.75 -18.86 21.42
All Epidemics (intensity in logs) 544 -8.31 9.45 -20.00 0.28
Arbovirus (intensity in logs) 544 -17.24 5.68 -20.00 0.01
Cholera (intensity in logs) 544 -10.84 7.30 -20.00 0.02
Malaria (intensity in logs) 544 -12.45 3.28 -20.00 0.28



























Chapter 4: Final Remarks and Policy recommendations 
In his remarks to president Bush on August 17, 2006, US Treasury Secretary, 
Henry Paulson Jr, made clear that governments care a lot about the macroeconomic 
implications of rare events, such as natural disasters and epidemics, stating “We need 
to be prepare to deal with everything from natural disasters to oil price shocks, the 
collapse of a major bank, or a sharp drop in the value of the dollar.”24 The fact that 
the government assigns the same level of concern to natural disasters, as it does to oil 
price shocks, banking and currency crisis suggests that researching these events is 
important. However, most of the time policy makers concentrate only  on the direct 
and inmediate damage generated by disaster events, and not on their long-run 
implications. This dissertation showed that medium-run and long-run implications are 
also important. A major conclusion of this dissertation is that rare events do matter 
for economic development and growth, and that governments should concentrate not 
only on policies that can reduce the initial disaster damage, but also on policies that 
can reduce the longer-term economic damage that disasters generate.   
Long-term risks emanating from these rare events need to be better 
recognized, as their potential costs are a threat to economic development. The papers 
in this thesis demonstrate that some of these large events significantly reduce growth. 
Therefore, governments need appropriate risk management strategies for future 
                                                 
24 Henry M. Paulson, Jr,, “On the Brink. Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial 





events, including medium-term financial planning covering 5 to 10 years. For 
example, natural hazard risk management should be integrated into longer-term 
national investment policies and development strategies and appropriately reflected in 
the allocation of financial resources.  
The financial effects of disasters can have long-term implications for broader 
economic policy. In Dominica these severe budgetary effects have been a factor in the 
adoption of major reforms. In the aftermath of Hurricane David, Dominica undertook 
certain reforms under a program supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
A second important conclusion is that, although rare events significantly 
affect economic development, their effects are not always negative and depend on the 
type of event being considered. Hence, in order to understand and assess the 
economic consequences of natural disasters and epidemics and the implications for 
policy, it is necessary to consider the pathways through which different types of 
events affect economic development, the different risks posed, and the ways in which 
economies can respond to these threats.  
These differences partly relate to differences in the probability of occurrence. 
In some countries, droughts, floods, storms and cholera occur frequently, and it is 
economically worthwhile to adapt productive activities—for instance, agricultural 
practices—so as to reduce risk. It is also worthwhile to take appropriate structural and 





infrastructure. By contrast, options for reducing vulnerability to earthquakes are 
largely restricted to physical structural and locational factors. 
In particular, our study shows that droughts have severe negative impacts on 
agriculture, and through that on economic development. This results should generate 
a concern. Governemnts need to strengthen climatic forecasting and promote the use 
of the information to support food security and improved management of agricultural 
and other renewable natural resources throughout the region. Climatic forecasting and 
information could help improve resilience to longer-term global climatic change by 
providing information that could be used to inform private and public decisions on 
the management of water resources, the choice of crops, and the level of grain exports 
and imports. Recognition of the severity of the economic impacts of drought should 
heighten the government’s interest in structural adjustment programs and increase 
much needed investment to prevent and mitigate the consequences of disasters.  
Cost-benefit analysis and investment analysis must be used to determine the 
economic efficiency of each type of disaster risk reduction action. Governments 
ought to develop a formal economic planning tool to assess risks more broadly by 
quantifying their potential implications for economic growth and the requirements for 
disaster prevention, mitigating their consequences and reconstruction funding. I 
believe that the findings of this thesis could act as a wakeup call to governments and 
the international community to take further preventive action. Papers of this kind can 
facilitate exploration of the implications of different types of rare event and the public 







More details on System GMM  
The content of this appendix comes from Loayza et al (2009). After 
accounting for time-specific effects, we can rewrite the growth regression equation 
as:  
tiitititi Xyy ,,1,, ' εηβα +++= −
r
  (A.2) 
To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first differences of equation 
A.2:  
( ) ( ) ( )y y y y X Xi t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t, , , , , , , ,'− = − + − + −− − − − −1 1 2 1 1α β ε ε  (A.3) 
The use of instruments is required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables and the problem that, by construction, the new error term, εi,t –
 εi,t–1, is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, yi,t–1 – yi,t–2. The instruments 
take advantage of the panel nature of the data set in that they consist of previous 
observations of the explanatory and lagged-dependent variables. Conceptually, this 
assumes that shocks to economic growth (that is, the regression error term) be 
unpredictable given past values of the explanatory variables.  The method does allow, 
however, for current and future values of the explanatory variables to be affected by 
growth shocks.  It is this type of endogeneity that the method is devised to handle.   
Under the assumptions that the error term, ε, is not serially correlated and that 
the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous (that is, the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), our application 





( ), 2 , , 1   0i t i t i tE y ε ε− − ⋅ − =    (A.4) 
( ), 2 , , 1   0i t i t i tE X ε ε− − ⋅ − =    (A.5) 
for t = 3,…, T. 25  (ee limit the set of instruments to five lags only, while the 
set of possible moment conditions includes all available lags.  We do it to avoid 
overfitting bias.  We return to this issue below.)  As mentioned above, the indicator of 
epidemics and the measures of external shocks (in terms of trade, foreign growth, and 
capital flows) are treated as exogenous variables.   
The GMM estimator based on the conditions in A.4 and A.5 is known as the 
difference estimator.  Notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel 
data estimators, the difference estimator has important statistical shortcomings. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) show that when 
the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are 
weak instruments for the regression equation in differences.  Instrument weakness 
influences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the difference estimator 
toward inefficient and biased coefficient estimates, respectively.26  
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the difference 
estimator, we use an estimator that combines the regression equation in differences 
and the regression equation in levels into one system (developed in Arellano and 
                                                 
25 Specifically, regarding the difference regression corresponding to the periods t and t-1, we use the 
following instruments:  for the variables measured as period averages --financial depth, government 
spending, inflation, and trade openness-- the instrument corresponds to the average of period t-2; for 
the variables measured as initial values --per capita output and secondary school enrollment-- the 
instrument corresponds to the observation at the start of period t-1. 
26 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator involves measurement error: 
differencing may exacerbate the bias stemming from errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-






Bover, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998).  For the equation in differences, the 
instruments are those presented above.  For the equation in levels (equation A.2), the 
instruments are given by the lagged differences of the explanatory variables.27  These 
are appropriate instruments under the assumption that the correlation between the 
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  (A.6) 
Using this stationarity property and the assumption of exogeneity of future 
growth shocks, the moment conditions for the second part of the system (the 
regression in levels) are given by: 
( ) ( ) 0  ][ ,2,1, =+⋅− −− tiititi yyE εη   (A.7) 
( ) ( ) 0 ][ ,2,1, =+⋅− −− tiititi XXE εη   (A.8) 
We thus use the moment conditions presented in equations A.2, A.5, A.7, and 
A.8 and employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and efficient estimates of 
the parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano and 
Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995).  These are given by the following formulas: 
 
yZZXXZZX 'ˆ')'ˆ'(ˆ 111 −−− ΩΩ=θ   (A.9) 
11 )'ˆ'()ˆ( −−Ω= XZZXAVAR θ    (A.10) 
                                                 
27 The timing of the instruments is analogous to that used for the difference regression: for the 
variables measured as period averages, the instruments correspond to the difference between t-1 and t-
2; and for the variables measured at the start of the period, the instruments correspond to the difference 






where θ is the vector of parameters of interest (α, β); 
 
y  is the dependent 
variable stacked first in differences and then in levels;  X  is the explanatory-variable 
matrix including the lagged dependent variable (yt–1, X) stacked first in differences 
and then in levels; Z is the matrix of instruments derived from the moment 
conditions; and Ω̂  is a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
moment conditions.28   
Note that we use only a limited set of moment conditions.  In theory the 
potential set of instruments spans all sufficiently lagged observations and, thus, grows 
with the number of time periods, T.  However, when the sample size in the cross-
sectional dimension is limited, it is recommended to use a smaller set of moment 
conditions in order to avoid over-fitting bias (see Arellano and Bond 1998; for a 
detailed discussion of over-fitting bias in the context of panel-data GMM estimation, 
see Roodman 2007).  This is our case, and therefore we use two steps to limit the 
moment conditions.  First, as described in detail above, we use as instruments only 
the first appropriate lag of each endogenous explanatory variable.  Second, we use a 
common variance-covariance of moment conditions across periods.  This results from 
substituting the assumption that the average (across periods) of moment conditions 
for a particular instrument be equal to zero for the assumption, conventional but more 
restrictive, that each of the period moment conditions be equal to zero.29  At the cost 
of the reduced efficiency, our two steps decrease over-fitting bias in the presence of 
                                                 
28 Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step procedure to obtain consistent and 
efficient GMM estimates. First, assume that the residuals, εi,t, are independent and homoskedastic both 
across countries and over time; this assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is used 
to produce first-step coefficient estimates. Second, construct a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix of the moment conditions with the residuals obtained in the first step, and then use 
this matrix to re-estimate the parameters of interest (that is, second-step estimates).  





small samples by accommodating cases when the unrestricted variance-covariance is 
too large for estimation and inversion given both a large number of explanatory 
variables and the presence of several time-series periods.   
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of 
the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We address 
this issue by considering two specification tests.  The first is the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which tests the validity of the instruments by analyzing 
the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process.  Failure 
to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model.  The second test examines 
whether the original error term (that is, ti,ε  in equation (A.2)) is serially correlated.  
The model is, therefore, supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected.  In the 
system specification, we test in fact whether the first-differenced error term (that is, 
the residual of the equation in differences) is second-order serially correlated.  First-
order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original 
error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  
Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original 
error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process of at least order 







Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
A) Economic Growth & Basic Determinants
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth GDP pc (%) 545 1.58 1.74 2.52 -5.75 9.86
Growth Agricultural Sector (%) 545 0.33 0.41 2.83 -13.17 11.49
Growth Industrial Sector (%) 545 1.73 1.62 3.84 -13.43 19.10
Growth Service Sector (%) 545 1.83 2.12 2.90 -13.14 12.33
Initial GDP pc (in logs) 545 7.61 7.48 1.55 4.44 10.53
Initial Agricultural Output pc (in logs) 545 5.25 5.26 0.79 2.87 7.97
Initial Industrial Output pc (in logs) 545 6.28 6.20 1.70 2.79 9.53
Initial Service Output pc (in logs) 545 6.92 6.82 1.69 3.22 10.09
Education (in logs) 545 3.62 3.80 0.90 0.11 4.97
Financial Depth (in logs) 545 3.42 3.38 0.87 0.14 5.40
Government Burden (in logs) 545 2.62 2.61 0.37 1.42 3.36
Inflation (log(100+%Growth rate of CPI)) 545 4.71 4.67 0.14 4.57 5.78
Trade Openness (in logs) 545 4.00 4.01 0.58 2.21 6.00
Growth rate of Terms of Trade 545 -0.38 -0.36 4.74 -18.86 21.42
B) Natural Disasters: Unconditional summary statistics C) Natural Disasters: Conditional on the occurrence of natural disasters
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
All Disasters (intensity in logs) 545 -9.81 -8.09 5.34 -20.00 -2.74 All Disasters (intensity in logs) 454 -7.76 -7.33 3.03 -17.66 -2.74
Droughts (intensity in logs) 545 -16.89 -20.00 5.84 -20.00 -2.74 Droughts (intensity in logs) 125 -6.45 -5.90 2.63 -16.43 -2.74
Floods (intensity in logs) 545 -12.31 -10.09 5.73 -20.00 -3.52 Floods (intensity in logs) 374 -8.79 -8.47 2.88 -19.09 -3.52
Earthquakes (intensity in logs) 545 -17.19 -20.00 4.65 -20.00 -3.04 Earthquakes (intensity in logs) 163 -10.60 -10.22 3.23 -18.97 -3.04
Storms (intensity in logs) 545 -15.66 -20.00 5.28 -20.00 -3.53 Storms (intensity in logs) 254 -10.70 -10.39 3.67 -19.50 -3.53
All Disasters (incidence: avg. num. of events) 545 0.47 0.20 0.66 0.00 5.40 All Disasters (incidence: avg. num. of events) 375 0.68 0.40 0.69 0.20 5.40
Droughts (incidence: avg. num. of events) 545 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.80 Droughts (incidence: avg. num. of events) 114 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.80
Floods (incidence: avg. num. of events) 545 0.24 0.20 0.36 0.00 2.20 Floods (incidence: avg. num. of events) 284 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.20 2.20
Earthquakes (incidence: avg. num. of events) 545 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.80 Earthquakes (incidence: avg. num. of events) 88 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.80










Descriptive Statistics: Developing Countries
Sample: 68 developing countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
A) Economic Growth & Basic Determinants
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth GDP pc (%) 407 1.35 1.46 2.71 -5.75 8.49
Growth Agricultural Sector (%) 407 0.12 0.30 2.83 -13.17 8.76
Growth Industrial Sector (%) 407 1.68 1.68 4.19 -13.43 19.10
Growth Service Sector (%) 407 1.58 1.90 3.18 -13.14 12.33
Initial GDP pc (in logs) 407 6.92 6.92 1.12 4.44 10.14
Initial Agricultural Output pc (in logs) 407 4.95 4.98 0.60 2.87 6.20
Initial Industrial Output pc (in logs) 407 5.58 5.69 1.35 2.79 9.35
Initial Service Output pc (in logs) 407 6.17 6.18 1.24 3.22 9.94
Education (in logs) 407 3.32 3.47 0.84 0.11 4.73
Financial Depth (in logs) 407 3.15 3.16 0.78 0.14 5.27
Government Burden (in logs) 407 2.52 2.49 0.35 1.42 3.32
Inflation (log(100+%Growth rate of CPI)) 407 4.73 4.69 0.16 4.57 5.78
Trade Openness (in logs) 407 4.00 3.99 0.60 2.21 6.00
Growth rate of Terms of Trade 407 -0.58 -0.61 5.27 -18.86 21.42
B) Natural Disasters: Unconditional summary statistics C) Natural Disasters: Conditional on the occurrence of natural disasters
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
All Disasters (intensity in logs) 407 -8.76 -7.27 5.02 -20.00 -2.74 All Disasters (intensity in logs) 354 -7.07 -6.76 2.67 -16.38 -2.74
Droughts (intensity in logs) 407 -15.95 -20.00 6.37 -20.00 -2.74 Droughts (intensity in logs) 122 -6.48 -5.91 2.65 -16.43 -2.74
Floods (intensity in logs) 407 -11.42 -8.95 5.77 -20.00 -3.52 Floods (intensity in logs) 292 -8.03 -7.85 2.43 -16.38 -3.52
Earthquakes (intensity in logs) 407 -17.09 -20.00 4.77 -20.00 -3.04 Earthquakes (intensity in logs) 122 -10.31 -9.91 3.16 -18.97 -3.04
Storms (intensity in logs) 407 -15.55 -20.00 5.51 -20.00 -3.53 Storms (intensity in logs) 181 -10.00 -9.65 3.56 -18.83 -3.53
All Disasters (incidence: avg. num. of events) 407 0.57 0.40 0.72 0.00 5.40 All Disasters (incidence: avg. num. of events) 318 0.73 0.40 0.74 0.20 5.40
Droughts (incidence: avg. num. of events) 407 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.80 Droughts (incidence: avg. num. of events) 111 0.30 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.80
Floods (incidence: avg. num. of events) 407 0.30 0.20 0.39 0.00 2.20 Floods (incidence: avg. num. of events) 252 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.20 2.20
Earthquakes (incidence: avg. num. of events) 407 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.80 Earthquakes (incidence: avg. num. of events) 71 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.80







Sample: 94 countries, 1961-2005 (5-year period observations)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 Growth rate GDP pc (%) 1.00
2 Growth rate Agricultural GDP pc (%) 0.33 1.00
3 Growth rate Industrial GDP pc (%) 0.83 0.14 1.00
4 Growth rate Service GDP pc (%) 0.82 0.21 0.54 1.00
5 Initial GDP pc (in logs) 0.21 0.10 0.03 0.19 1.00
6 Initial Agricultural Value Added pc (in logs) 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.74 1.00
7 Initial Industrial Value Added pc (in logs) 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.20 0.98 0.71 1.00
8 Initial Service Value Added pc (in logs) 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.99 0.73 0.97 1.00
9 All Disasters (intensity in logs) -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.29 -0.18 -0.26 -0.28 1.00
10 Droughts (intensity in logs) -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.34 -0.31 -0.34 -0.34 0.52 1.00
11 Floods (intensity in logs) 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.07 -0.21 -0.11 -0.17 -0.20 0.73 0.24 1.00
12 Earthquakes (intensity in logs) 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.40 0.18 0.33 1.00
13 Storms (intensity in logs) 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.47 0.24 0.27 0.26 1.00
14 Education: Enrollment in Secondary School (in logs)0.24 0.15 0.02 0.23 0.79 0.60 0.81 0.78 -0.10 -0.22 -0.02 0.15 0.22 1.00
15 Financial Depth (in logs) 0.26 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.74 -0.16 -0.19 -0.07 0.04 0.16 0.62 1.00
16 Government Burden (in logs) -0.06 0.02 -0.13 -0.04 0.40 0.23 0.39 0.38 -0.26 -0.12 -0.28 -0.18 -0.19 0.32 0.38 1.00
17 Inflation (Log(100%+Growth Rate CPI)) -0.25 -0.06 -0.22 -0.19 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24 -0.20 1.00
18 Trade Openness (in logs) 0.09 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.15 -0.02 0.17 0.15 -0.21 -0.13 -0.23 -0.26 -0.14 0.22 0.24 0.34 -0.28 1.00
19 Growth rate Terms of Trade (%) 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.06 1.00
20 All Epidemics (intensity in logs) -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.12 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.04 1.00
21 Arbovirus (intensity in logs) -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.23 0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 1.00
22 Cholera (intensity in logs) 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.28 -0.24 -0.26 -0.35 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.07 0.03 -0.15 -0.22 -0.17 0.06 -0.11 0.04 0.02 0.33 1.00
23 Malaria (intensity in logs) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.36 0.18 0.30 1.00
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